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Introduction 
The rise and fall of nations is nothing new in world history. Throughout our past we 
find empires that have attained unprecedented might. With technological advances, powerful 
empires (and nations) started to project their power even outside their region.  The emergence 
of powerful states or tribes that tried to spread their power throughout the world can be found 
throughout history. From a European perspective, the modern era started with the emergence 
of Portugal and Spain in the 15th century and would reach its climax before World War II with 
the British Empire. After the war, two new powerful blocks formed: the Soviet Union and the 
United States (and its allies).  
In general, a similar pattern emerges with both, nations and individuals. Like people, 
governments want to ascend the power rankings to gain influence and might. However, as one 
person or country moves up, others have to fall. The basis of everyone’s success is the 
respective person’s or country’s capabilities. In the case of countries, these consist of 
economic, military, and political variables, which, when combined, amount to a country’s 
overall ability and strength. Put in relation to other countries, we can create a ranking. 
Naturally, those nations which possess the greatest capabilities are ranked on top, and those 
lacking are at the bottom. It is also natural to assume that all nations want to improve their 
standing or remain on top. This, in turn, inevitably leads to a conflict between the have and 
the have-not nations, that will, in the worst case, be resolved through military action. In the 
end, all great powers are vanquished as new challengers rise and overpower them. 
The rise of China as a power is an event that will have significant global implications. 
In this paper I explore the extent to which China’s geopolitical emergence has had an impact 
on Southeast Asia - and Vietnam in particular - between 1990 and 2008. As Beijing moves up 
the power ranking, other nations will be challenged and become dependent on China, if they 
are too weak to balance Chinese actions, for example in the South China Sea which the 
Chinese claims as a whole.The government in Beijing has set the goal to make China the 
center of the world again in a time when the country was relatively weak compared to many 
powers in the world system. In the long run, it seems that even the United States, being 
considered the world’s strongest country in terms of economic and military power, will have 
to deal with the matter at some point as the possibility of China becoming a super-power 
grows more likely every year. However, so far, it has mostly been China’s neighbors that had 
experienced a more confident and aggressive People’s Republic.  
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CHAPTER 1 - Neorealism 
In this chapter I will lay out the theoretical framework for this paper. First, I will 
introduce Neorealism. I believe this theory best explains the actions of the Chinese 
government in the world system since 1990 as we witness the emergence of another potential 
superpower – if it has not already reached that status - which poses a serious threat to the 
status quo of the United States as the hegemon. Next, I will highlight the advantages of 
Kenneth Waltz’s theory of Neorealism as well as the opposition it faces throughout academia.  
The paper will then review the most common variations and developments of 
Neorealism (or Structural Neorealism), such as Defensive and Offensive Realism, 
respectively. The third part of this chapter will provide a short summary of Waltz’s system 
(system, or theory?). I will then explain relevant factors in my analysis of China, as I believe 
there are some aspects that neorealism does not cover that still merit attention in order to 
understand the interaction between states. 
 
WHY A THEORY? 
Establishing a theory means to create a framework within which we can operate. Also, 
we need to be aware that a theory is an abstraction of reality. This means that we look only at 
things that we want to explain and assume everything else as given. Waltz points out that we 
have to distinguish between laws and theories. A theory stating that a good has become more 
expensive because prices have changed is of little to no help. And it is no theory, but a law. 
Here we can see why Waltz writes that “Theories explain laws.”1 It is a law that if the price 
goes up, the good becomes more expensive. But the theory behind it is that if, for example, 
supply or demand changes, we see a change in the price as well. Waltz states, “Because a law 
does not say why a particular association holds, it cannot tell us whether we can exercise 
control and how we might go about doing so, we need a theory.”2 A theory helps us to explain 
events and even make predictions for the future under the same circumstances. And by scaling 
down, we develop a simplified version of reality, where the emphasis lies with “simple.”3  
                                                 
1 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading Mass., USA, 1979), p.6 
2 Waltz, Theory, p.6 
3 Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics. A Modern Approach (New York, USA, 2003), p.1 
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As we shall see in a short example now, every theory has its limitations. If we tell our 
children they need to have good grades in school (and later in college too) if they want to 
have a well-paid job someday, we do not do that because a law says that good grades open the 
doors to a good job. We do it because we make the assumption that if our child performs 
better in class than the rest, this opens doors to better jobs. And here we have our theory 
where we assume that good grades in general lead to a good job. Our theory holds since we 
can observe that good grades indeed enable students to pursue the job of their dreams. 
However, we can also see the limitations of a theory in this example. Good grades 
alone are no guarantee that one gets the position he or she seeks as there are also other things 
that are important. For many companies it is not only important that an applicant has finished 
his or her degree in the shortest period of time possible, but also that he or she possesses 
distinct soft skills. Furthermore, to many companies the field of study and the university at 
which you studied are of importance too. Then there is the requirement of most companies 
that the applicant has done some significant extracurricular work during his studies.We can 
now see that every theory has its limitations. Even though the theory states that good grades 
lower the entrance barrier to the more prestigious jobs, it does not reflect reality on a one-to-
one scale, as the additional points, such as internships and the personal situation of the 
applicant, are not being considered. Nevertheless, the theory about good grades at least lets us 
know “…what to expect and why to expect it. [Thus] within a system, a theory explains 
recurrences and repetitions, not change.”4 
 
STRUCTURAL NEOREALISM 
System Theory 
Neorealism was introduced by Kenneth Waltz in his book “Theory of International 
Theory” in 1979. In his book, one of Waltz’s goals was to “construct a theory of international 
politics that remedies the defects of present theories.”5 For Waltz, some traditional realists 
reason that an international system’s stability depends primarily on the relative military power 
of the states. However, he urges the need to introduce a so-called “systems theory” which 
                                                 
4 Waltz, Theory, p.69 
5 Waltz, Theory, p.1 
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“deals with the forces that are in play at the international, and not at the national, level.”6 In 
order to achieve his goal, Waltz builds his model of international politics on microeconomic 
theory because it “describes how an order is spontaneously formed from the self-interested 
acts and interactions of individual units – in this case, persons and firms.”7  
Another reason why Waltz focuses his theory on states is the fact that, even though 
states, like companies in a market, are not the only actors in an international system, they are 
– again, like companies - the major players. And like the market, where the big players have 
the greatest say, “International structures are defined in terms of the primary political units of 
an era, be thy city states, empires, or nations. Structures emerge from the coexistence of states. 
No state intends to participate in the formation of a structure by which it and others will be 
constrained.”8 In addition, like in the markets, where firms die and new ones are created, 
states in an international system are conquered or fall apart and new ones are proclaimed– for 
example, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, or (and?) the Habsburg Monarchy were succeeded by 
a number of countries. Therefore, Waltz makes it very easy for himself and argues that, “Just 
as economists define markets in terms of firms, so I define international-political structure in 
terms of states.”9  
Structure of the System 
In the following section I will focus on the three most important features of a (neo-) 
realist system. The most distinctive feature of the system is referred to as “anarchy,” which 
“entails relations of coordination among a system’s units, and that implies their sameness.”10 
In contrast to domestic systems, which are hierarchically ordered and centrally controlled, 
there is no government in the international system where each unit is equal, and no one has 
control over another. Waltz points out that, “To say that a state is sovereign means that it 
decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and external problems, including whether 
or not to seek assistance from others and in doing so to limit its freedom by making 
commitments to them”11 but they cannot behave as they please since their potential future 
actions are (pre-) determined by their relative strength in the system. 
                                                 
6 Waltz, Theory, p.1 
7 Waltz, Theory, p.89 
8 Waltz, Theory, p.91 
9 Waltz, Theory, p.94 
10 Waltz, Theory, p.93 
11 Waltz, Theory, p.96 
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However, in an anarchic system a world government would not exist for two reasons. 
First, if there was a world government, the system would not be anarchic anymore, but 
hierarchical. And second, if there was indeed a world government, states would strive to 
control it and in this wrangling over control, the nations with better capabilities would use 
their (military) power in order prevail over the weaker ones. This in turn means that the world 
would end up in what Waltz calls a “world civil war.”12 Therefore, the principle holds: No 
one commands, and no one has to obey.  
The second major feature Waltz claims to justify his system is that, due to the 
similarity between economic markets and international-political systems, “International 
politics is structurally similar to a market economy insofar as the self-help principle is 
allowed to operate in the latter.” 13 For example, if being threatened, a country turns to 
military action. In the territorial disputes, China, for example, has sent its navy to the South 
China Sea to protect its interests against other nations such as the Philippines and Vietnam 
because it feels threatened.14 Iran, too, tries to protect its interests with military action. In the 
never-ending “war of words”, as CNN put it, Tehran, even though not directly addressing 
them, claims that U.S. military presence in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf creates 
nothing but mayhem for the region. As a result, it threatens to block the strait. This would 
have serious repercussions for the world economy, as it “is the only outlet from the Persian 
Gulf with 17 million barrels of oil per day passing through in 2011.”15  
The third distinct virtue Waltz attributes to the structure of his system is what he calls 
flexibility. Thus, nations can transform from, say, a democracy to a dictatorship. Waltz found 
a way to maintain his political system, as the “structure defines the arrangement, or the 
ordering, of the parts of a system.”16 This is important to him because now it does not matter 
whether there are five, seven, or only two great powers – which possess the largest 
capabilities - that form the structure; the anarchic system where each state works for itself is 
maintained. And just as “societies establish norms of behaviors,”17 the leading nations set the 
framework. 
                                                 
12 Waltz, Theory, p.112 
13 Waltz, Theory, p.91 
14 Daniel Ten Kate, China Proposes Maritime ’Network’ Fund to Help Resolve Shipping Disputes, Bloomberg 
News (20.11.2011). Online: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-19/china-says-sea-navigation-not-a-
factor-as-wen-talks-with-obama-in-bali.html (accessed: 03.01.2012) 
15 CNN Wire Staff; Iran says U.S. warships in Persian Gulf spawn 'mayhem'; CNN online (04.01.2012). Online: 
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/01/04/world/meast/iran-strait/index.html?iref=allsearch (accessed: 05.01.2012) 
16 Waltz, Theory, p.81 
17 Waltz, Theory, p.75 
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Gilpin supports this by arguing that 
“the distribution of power among states constitutes the principal form of 
control in every International system. The dominant states and empires in 
every international system organize and maintain the network of political, 
economic, and other relationships within the system and especially in their 
respective spheres of influence.”18  
But can a change in the structure take place at all? Unlike others, such as Robert Gilpin who 
considers himself to be a “state-centric realist”19, a change in the structure of the system does, 
for Waltz, not only depend on the military capabilities of states, but on their economic and 
political capabilities as well: “The structure of a system changes with changes in the 
distribution of capabilities across the system’s units.”20 A change in the relative capabilities 
of states means that “anarchic systems are transformed only by changes in organizing 
principle and by consequential changes in the number of their principal parties.”21 If a nation 
manages to increase its capabilities relative to others, it moves up the power ladder. If that 
nation becomes equal among the great powers, this is not a problem for Waltz. Rather, even 
though it changes the structure, it does not change the system. 
Balance of Power 
In an international system, as we shall see later, a balance of power can be achieved, 
depending on the number of great powers, either externally or internally. Because states seek 
at least their own survival and at the maximum “universal domination,” 22  the balancing 
process is a recurring event, as  
“the conclusion of one hegemonic war is the beginning of another cycle of 
growth, expansion, and eventual decline. The law of uneven growth continues 
to redistribute power, thus undermining the status quo established by the last 
hegemonic struggle. Disequilibrium replaces equilibrium, and the world moves 
toward a new round of hegemonic conflict.”23  
This means that if state A aspires to hegemony, other states will, at some point form a 
coalition to balance A’s ambitions. 
                                                 
18 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, UK, 1981), p.29f 
19 Robert Gilpin, Profile. In: Department of Politics, Princeton University. Online: 
http://www.princeton.edu/politics/people/display_person.xml?netid=rggilpin&display=faculty (accessed: 
07.06.2012) 
20 Waltz, Theory, p.97 
21 Waltz, Theory, p.161 
22 Waltz, Theory, p.118 
23 Gilpin, War and Change, p.210 
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However, before that point is reached, states bandwagon with state A as long as they 
benefit from it to improve their position in the system as well. But when states start to oppose 
the hegemon-to-be, they do so, to use Machiavelli’s words, “…in the belief that they will 
better themselves by the change. It is this belief that makes them take up arms against the 
reigning prince [state].”24 This process does not take place peacefully, though. Gilpin argues 
that in this process, on one side,  
“The once dominant state is decreasingly able to impose its will on others 
and/or to protect its interests. [And on the other side,] the rising state or states 
in the system increasingly demand changes in the system that will reflect their 
newly gained power and their unmet interests. Finally, the stalemate and issue 
of who will run the system are resolved through armed conflict.”25  
While for Waltz, states’ ambitions to better their position in whatever way are driven 
by first, the fear that the stronger state will harm them. And second, that they are seeking to 
gain power. Owen, for example, argues that “if a balance of power entails states’ acting, 
intentionally or not, so as to form that balance, then it follows that a theory predicting that 
balance must predict that states will act so as to bring it about.”26 Owen appears to think that 
states do not act in a “Waltzian way” and seek to maximize their power, but that they rather 
pursue a course of action that places a constant balance of power above each state’s 
preferences and gains. This, however, would mean that all states are willing to cooperate and 
coordinate their actions on a mutual basis.  
Keohane opposes Waltz on the power maximizing issue for a different reason that 
Owen. He claims that states  
“concerned with self-preservation do not seek to maximize their power when 
they are not in danger. …they realize that a relentless search for universal 
domination may jeopardize their own autonomy. Thus they moderate their 
efforts when their positions are secure. Conversely, they intensify their efforts 
when danger arises, which assumes that they are not maximizing them under 
more benign conditions.”27  
But why would states not try to maximize their power?  
                                                 
24 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince. In: Christian E. Detmold, Historical, Political, and Diplomatic Writings of 
Niccolo Machiavelli, Vol. II (Boston, 1882), pp.1-92,p.6 
25 Gilpin, War and Change, p.33 
26 John M. Owen, Domestically driven Deviations. Internal Regimes, Leaders, and Realism’s Power Line. In: 
Ernest R. May, Richard Rosecrance, and Zara Steiner (eds.), History and Neorealism (Cambridge, UK, 2010), 
pp.29-48, p.29 
27 Robert Keohane, Theory of World Politics. Structural Realism and Beyond. In: Robert O. Keohane (ed.), 
Neorealism and its Critics (New York, 1986), pp.158-203, p.174 
 11 
 
After all, are firms not constantly trying to improve their position in the market by 
reducing costs, introducing new, better products to lure customers away from their 
competition in order to gain market share? Plus, anarchy makes sure that states can never be 
sure of their security. If it is part of a coalition it has to be concerned that it might get betrayed 
by its partners. And if a state is the strongest, anarchy makes sure that the other nations, in 
fear of their autonomy and survival, put up resistance. The goal is to lower the relative 
strength of the hegemon (or the strongest nation) and form a new “balance-equilibrium.” 
Different Systems 
A multipolar system is characterized by the fact that “three or more states control one 
another's actions through diplomatic maneuver, shifting alliances, and open conflict.”28 To 
find out which powers join forces depends on which of the three have most in common. 
Namely, formations will arise when different states identify the same aggressor(s). However, 
an alignment of three powers has “unfortunate characteristics. Two powers can easily gang 
up on the third, divide the spoils, and drive the system back to bipolarity.”29 Therefore, Waltz 
claims that in a multipolar system the number of states should be either four or five.  
A formation of five great powers, which we have experienced in Europe until World 
War I, and where the composition of alliances changed regularly, has one nation that makes 
sure that neither side become too strong. In Europe, this this nation was the United Kingdom 
which sided with the weaker coalition to ensure a military balance and stability. This is 
because a system with four states “permits external alignment and promises considerable 
stability.”30 While this may be an ideal arrangement, Waltz forgets that even in a system of 
four nations, three can still gang up on the fourth, which would leave us, again, in a system of 
three. Such an alignment also provides the opportunity for two nations ganging up on the third 
state, leading to a system where there are only two great powers. In the end, the multipolar 
system is not stable enough because “there are too many powers to permit any of them to 
draw clear and fixed lines between allies and adversaries….”31 
 
                                                 
28 Gilpin, War and Change, p.29 
29 Waltz, Theory, p.163 
30 Waltz, Theory, p.163 
31 Waltz, Theory, p.168 
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Väyrynen argues that, in a multi-polar system, the difference between the countries’ 
ideologies may not be as obvious as in a duo-polistic system, where “political systems [are] 
polarized into two camps.”32 Several examples support his view. The United States and the 
Soviet Union have had strikingly different ideologies and goals. On the other side, the great 
powers in the European Union (France, Germany, United Kingdom, and Italy) have similar 
approaches and goals to how Europe should like in the future. The EU furthermore offers 
more possibilities for states to interact with each other, which, again, lowers risks of 
confrontation, even though states constantly oppose each other on various issues. However, 
European institutions and regulated processes often offer a solution to a problem. 
In his analysis, Waltz sees the world in a bipolar system divided between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. This is the most stable system as there is only one possible 
arrangement and the absence of any possible alliances. Also, interdependence is low in this 
system, meaning that both great powers do not depend on each other economically and 
militarily, as Waltz notes that “countries that are highly dependent, countries that get much of 
what they badly need from a few possibly unreliable suppliers, must do all they can to 
increase the chances that they will keep getting it.”33 Therefore, with the potential that others 
might gang up on a country eliminated and the independence from the other power is high and 
the potential of a country’s miscalculation of the other country’s potential actions is not an 
issue as states can only do so in a multi-polar system. 
In a bipolar system, on the other side,  
“only two powers [are] capable of acting on a world scale [and] anything that 
happens anywhere is potentially of concern to both of them. Bipolarity extends 
the geographic scope of both powers’ concern. It also broadens the range of 
factors included in the competition between them. Because allies add relatively 
little to the superpowers’ capabilities, they concentrate their attention on their 
own dispositions.”34 
Therefore, in a bipolar world, war can only break out due to an overreaction by either state 
and the relative strength is determined by internal efforts and not by the combined strength of 
allies. 
                                                 
32 Raimo Väyrynen, Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Domestic Political Systems. In: Journal of Peace Research, 
Vol.32, No.3 (August 1995), pp. 361-371, p. 363 
33 Waltz, Theory, p.153 
34 Waltz, Theory, p.171 
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Väyrynen suggests that ”in a bipolar conflict, the state with the strongest capabilities 
and its allies have a structural opportunity to give more freedom to their civil societies.”35 
Looking at the Cold War again, we find that the people of the “western nations” enjoyed 
much more personal freedom and prosperity between 1945 and 1990 than did their 
counterparts behind the iron curtain. This also explains why people fled to the west and not to 
the east. However, Väyrynens suggestion that this is only true for a conflict between two great 
nations is not entirely correct. After all, people from Cuba are fleeing to the United States and 
Mexicans try to cross the border to its northern neighbor illegally as well. But neither is a 
great power in the international system, nor at war with the United States.  
Another alignment of states would be a hegemonic one, where there is only one “great 
power” that controls everything based on its (military) power. Here, again, Gilpin supports 
Waltz’s views on history:  
“A single powerful state controls or dominates the lesser states in the system. 
This type of system has, in fact, been most prevalent, at least until modern 
times, and scholars of international relations have detected a propensity for 
every international system to evolve in the direction of a universal empire.”36 
There are also plenty of examples to be found in world history. For example, the 
Roman Empire, in its pursuit of world domination, spread as far as it could through the 
application of military force. The same holds true for Napoleon’s empire. Based on military 
action, Napoleon expanded the French empire and endowed it with vast political powers so 
that it could be seen temporarily as Europe’s hegemon. However, as already mentioned above, 
at some point the other states managed (through a coalition) to overthrow Napoleon.  
According to Gilpin’s theory, when France was put back in place within the 
international system, a new struggle for leadership within the system began. In this respect, 
John Mearsheimer argues that there cannot be a global hegemon whatsoever. He agrees with 
Waltz that being the hegemon would be any country’s best case scenario because “its survival 
then would almost be guaranteed.”37 However, no hegemon can cover the entire globe with 
its military and political forces. Therefore, regional hegemony is the best a state can achieve. 
But why is it then that states fear the emergence of other states? 
                                                 
35 Väyrynen, Bipolarity, p.364 
36 Gilpin, War and Change, p.29 
37 John Mearsheimer, The Gathering Storm. China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia. In: The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics, Vol.3 (2010), p.381-396, p.387 
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Mearsheimer argues that a regional hegemon “check[s] aspiring hegemons in other 
regions, because they fear that a rival great power that dominates its own region will be an 
especially powerful foe that is essentially free to roam around the globe and cause trouble in 
their backyard.”38 This statement explains why President Obama has shifted the United States 
military focus on Asia because the United States fear the emergence of China which can cause 
troubles in some other parts of the world for Washington. From China’s point of view, the 
United States’ military presence in Asia – from troops stationed in Japan and South Korea, to 
the regular military exercises with Taiwan and South Korea – are a thorn in China’s side 
because it interferes with China’s intentions.  
Cooperation and Distribution of Gains 
Survival tactics and security dilemma 
After having introduced the framework and basic characteristics of Waltz’s system 
theory, I will now take focus on some of the major points of criticism of the theory: Later on, 
I will also look at the distribution of capabilities and the character of the units. Cooperation 
and the distribution of gains are the two issues that I will focus on first, as these have to be 
looked at together since we know that it is the anarchic environment that causes countries to 
pursue a self-interest, and survival-first strategy. This also means that states are averse to 
cooperate because there is no one they can trust.  
The “lack of trust” among nations stems from each nation’s state of mind: nations are 
constantly in fear of being taken advantage of. Therefore, instead of using their full 
capabilities to increase their economic well-being, states rather use some of their resources to 
build up military capabilities in order to maintain their autonomy. If nations really distrust 
each other, and if survival is not guaranteed at any point, why should a country focus on, say, 
economic development and prosperity. After all, in case it gets betrayed and conquered by its 
former partner everything it has built up will be lost instantly. Therefore, the only “logical” 
goal a state can have is to do whatever is necessary to ensure its own survival. 
If cooperation happens to take place between two states, each starts to specialize 
economically in what it does best, which in turn means that its dependency on the other nation 
increases significantly since it relies more on the provision of goods it needs. Therefore, 
countries that have a negative trade balance are even more dependent on others because they 
                                                 
38 Mearsheimer, The Gathering Storm, p.388 
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have to finance their trade deficit by for example, the use of their central banks reserves or by 
borrowing money from abroad. This means that they will depend even more on other states. 
Waltz says that, if “states that are heavily dependent, or closely interdependent, worry about 
securing that which they depend on.”39 This means that each country tries to assure that its 
most valuable capabilities remain uncontested by others. 
Furthermore, Waltz argues that “the larger the state’s imports and exports, the more it 
depends on others.”40 That means that if a country’s total trade has a large share of GDP it is 
more dependent on others compared to when its share is relatively small. In 2008, trade as a 
share of GDP was 31% in the United States and 35% in Japan, respectively.41 But it was 90% 
in Germany and 171 % in Vietnam.42 Considering that trade is also affected by geography 
(which isolates Japan and other island nations to some extent), we can see that the United 
States is in both, absolute and relative terms less dependent on foreign cooperation than other 
states. Germany, on the other side, will, according to Waltz, suffer even more if one of its 
major trading partners stops buying goods. 
This has to be the case because “if domestic substitutions for foreign imports cannot be 
made, or can be made only at high cost, trade becomes of higher value to a country and of 
first importance to those who conduct its foreign policy.”43 With that, Waltz means that if a 
country that has a high level of trade as a share of GDP it depends more on the partners’ good 
will to keep supplying the goods needed. If that stops to happen, the country affected will not 
be able to supply its economy and will therefore lose power relative to others. As a result, 
larger countries have an advantage over smaller ones since they can produce more things at 
home and, by doing so, reduce their dependency.44 
Another problem concerns the number of great powers in a system. The greater the 
number of states involved, the greater the distrust and interdependence among each other 
since each country has to be afraid that one of its partners might join the other coalition or 
stop abiding by the agreements made. This, in turn, increases insecurity within the coalition 
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http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS?order=wbapi_data_value_2010+wbapi_data_value+wba
pi_data_value-last&sort=asc 
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significantly because subsequently, a nation cannot trust its partner in a conflict situation, 
such as a war, if it already gets deceived in arguably less important matters.  
As an example we might consider Poland in 1939, which was guaranteed by the 
British and the French that each would come to her rescue in case of a German invasion. As 
we know, despite their respective declarations of war neither state went on to attack Germany 
militarily, but Nazi-Germany occupied Poland. This is a typical case where politicians should 
have distrusted their alleged partner. One might argue that Poland did not have another choice 
but to hope for support, but in the end, it turns out that just because nations (or politicians) 
commit to something does not mean that will stick to their commitment after all. After all, it is 
one thing to commit to something on a piece of paper, but an entirely other things to act.  
Robert Jervis indicates that one of the reasons why countries get betrayed are different 
values, beliefs, and goals of the other’s leadership. Changes in the goals and values have, in 
Jervis’ opinion, “always been involved in the most far-reaching changes in international 
politics.”45 Thus, it seems to me that the British and French leadership (and probably the rest 
of the world too) had the “wrong beliefs” about what Germany was going to do, and were 
therefore caught by surprise when Germany invaded Poland. A question that arises – even 
though I will not elaborate on it - is whether Poland could have saved itself by pursuing a 
different approach towards Germany? To answer this, Waltz would tell us to look at the 
respective military capabilities. 
Lack of knowledge 
Another reason states do not like to cooperate is that they know too little or nothing 
about each other’s intentions. This lack of information obviously causes distrust among states. 
It is similar to buying a car. If the seller does not provide all the details about the car, one will 
be very reluctant to even consider buying it. However, if the information needed is available 
though, one will at least think about it. If one does not buy the car in the end, it is because the 
buyer does not like it and not because he or she did not receive critical information. Therefore, 
why should nations collaborate if people will not even buy a car without sufficient 
information? 
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According to neoliberals, international institutions can help to solve these problems. 
Institutionalists, such as Robert Keohane, believe this to be possible for various reasons. 
However, it has to be mentioned first that “modern” liberals also accept the four core 
assumptions of Neorealism.46 However, they still consider anarchy to differ from the (neo-) 
realist version as “institutional theorists are careful to distinguish anarchy in this sense from 
chaos, and do not accept neorealist assertions that the fact of anarchy has far-reaching 
negative implications for cooperation.”47 Instead, Institutionalists assume the absence of a 
world government. Here, (neo-) realists would argue that a world government only leads to a 
fight among nations to control it. Ultimately, in this confrontation only the strongest country 
will prevail. 
While realists argue that cooperation between states can only be based on a “shallow” 
short-term, ad-hoc basis48, institutional theorists try to show the opposite. Especially Keohane 
emphasizes that international institutions support nations to move closer together as they 
“create the capability for states to cooperate in mutually beneficial ways by reducing the 
costs of making and enforcing agreements.”49 With the creation of these institutions, which 
can take on the form of formal intergovernmental, non-governmental organizations, 
international regimes, and informal conventions50, they see a chance for states to achieve 
things through tough bargaining within a framework of “common rules and practices.”51 
Naturally, the more nations get involved in bargaining talks, the more complicated it will be 
to reach an agreement that satisfies all parties involved. In bilateral talks, only two sides have 
to agree, while the 25-states-formation of the European Union makes it much more difficult to 
please all nations. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 states are the main actors in the system; they act rationally and in a self-interest manner, anarchy prevails in 
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48 Keohane, Martin, How International Institutions, p.53 
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Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring, 1998), pp.82-96+194, p.86 
50 Keohane, Martin, How International Institutions, p.55 
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 18 
 
Distribution of Gains 
Rosecrance points out, that countries can have different perceptions about the 
distribution of wealth and power. Some states might believe that the pie cannot become larger 
and that “one’s gain would be another’s loss” 52 . In the case of the EU, smaller states 
constantly complain that policies are tailored towards larger countries’ needs. The main 
players, however, insist that these policies are passed for the greater good. As Jervis lays it out; 
“for decision makers, the question is never cooperation or defection, but rather what goals to 
seek and the tactics that will be most apt to reach them.”53 In the end, the question is whether 
cooperation is actually worth giving up autonomy and how much one can gain from it 
(compared to the partner(s)). If both states are equally strong at the beginning of their 
collaboration and the gains created favor state A more than B, then B will be worried. 
Whether states only care about maximizing their gains or whether they aim at 
maximizing their gains relative to their partner is one of the big attacks on Neorealism 
theorists argue about. Neorealists argue “that a state’s ends and means alike will be dictated 
by its relative power ranking”54 and that it will decide between either to bandwagon with or to 
balance against the other nation according to its relative military strength.55 However, weaker 
states will bandwagon with their stronger partner only until a certain point and then start to 
take on a balancing attitude. 
A stronger nation, on the other side, will automatically balance a potential threat to 
prevent its emergence. Suppose that due to a trade agreement country A is about to become a 
hegemon in the near future because the agreement is in its favor and will help to increase its 
capabilities significantly more than the other nations. At one point the partners, that are all 
about to become relatively weaker, will form a new coalition to balance the potential super 
power. The point at which states start to resist will depend on the gains they receive from 
bandwagoning compared to the price they have to pay. After all, at this particular point, states 
start to balance because they realize that their partners’ gains are highly unfavorable for them 
and that their autonomy is in jeopardy. 
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In this calculation states do not only consider what they gain or have to give up now, 
but also what might happen in the future. As Grieco argues, states also have to consider “that 
suffering gaps in gains today might result in an erosion of their independence and autonomy 
tomorrow.”56 The advanced partner might use the increased economic (and military) strength 
to impose more and more less-favorable terms on the weaker state, which, in turn, would 
widen the gains gap even more. 57 Grieco adds to this that nations also fear cooperating 
because once one nation has  
“become powerful enough to restrict (again through the application of 
nonmilitary forms of influence) the capacity of the disadvantaged partner for 
independent choice and action in the domain in which cooperation is occurring 
and other domains to which that domain is related.”58  
Liberal Institutionalists would say that states do not care about other state’s incentives 
to cooperate because they only seek “to achieve the greatest possible individual gains. They 
do not care whether partners achieve or do not achieve gains, or whether those gains are 
large or small, or whether such gains are greater or less than gain they themselves 
achieve.”59 Keohane argues that in a fight between two states, international institutions disarm, 
or solve, the relative-gains problem because  
“most issues of potential cooperation … involve multilateral negotiations that 
make relative gains hard to calculate and entail little risk of decisive power 
shifts for one side over another. Therefore, states can be expected most of the 
time to seek to enhance their own welfare without being worried that other will 
also make advances.”60  
Therefore, if states know more about each other, the system will be more stable and military 
conflicts become less likely because the probability of miscalculation is reduced. Second, if 
states trust each other, they see an incentive to seek cooperation (in the long run) instead of 
short-term cooperation.  
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Capabilities and the character of units 
Even though Waltz keeps telling us that we only have to look at the international level, 
and that the characteristics of units do not matter, he “admits” that like in the market economy, 
where a large number of firms operate, the world is made of a large number of states. Waltz 
points out that 
“when the total number of firms in a sector is large, their interactions can be 
understood, though not fully predicted, through theories about oligopoly of the 
number of consequential firms reduces to a small number by virtue of the 
preeminence of a few of them. International politics can be viewed in the same 
way.”61  
But, in order to figure out who the major companies are, we need to establish certain criteria 
that will help to filter out the weaker and less significant states. And the stricter the criteria, 
the smaller the number of states that possess these characteristics will be. Therefore, in 
addition to anarchy, the distribution of capabilities helps define the structure of a system as 
well. 
Applying his filters, Waltz points out that in a system nations have to develop all their 
capabilities to be a great power. A nation is never ranked on top because it is an economic 
powerhouse while militarily weak and politically instable. Nor is it a superpower if it has the 
world’s largest army despite a weak economy that leaves its population starving. This point of 
view explains the fall of the Soviet Union. In the end and despite having immense military 
forces, Moscow was not able to keep up economically with the United States which led to its 
breakdown and the loss of the superpower status. For Waltz, a nation has to be strong in all of 
the following categories:62 
 • Size of population and territory 
• Resource endowment 
• Economic capability 
• Military strength 
• Political stability and competence 
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A country small in size and population will not be able to exercise vast political 
influence as it lacks the economic and military power to enforce it. It will rather depend on a 
larger (and stronger) partner to protect it. For this “service” the small country will be willing 
to give up some of its autonomy. An example would be the European Union which (among 
other things) protects and advocates the interests of its member states. In turn, the EU-
members give up some political autonomy. For example, if Brussels passes a law each state 
has to implement it. But if one nation gets attacked, the EU-in theory-will defend it. The 
United States, on the other side, do not need a protector as it has all, the size, the economic 
strength and the military power to enforce their political goals.  
Furthermore, states also seek to secure as much of the most important resources as 
possible for them. This is for several reasons. First, apart from political prowess, strategic 
resources such as oil and certain raw materials provide, together with the labor force, the 
backbone of a country’s economy. China is amassing important resources such as coal and oil. 
China’s coal production increased roughly 277 % between 2000 and 20010 and its 
consumption increased some 298% in the same period of time.63 In 2010, China still needed 
to import around 170,000 short tons of coal in order to satisfy demand. The situation is even 
more striking with oil. In 2010 China’s oil production was short of 4 million barrels per day. 
However, the economy’s demand was around 8.5 million barrels per day. 64  
In order to keep its economic (and therefore political) emergence going, China has to 
find ways and partners to satisfy its needs. As we shall see later, China sticks, at least in this 
point, to Waltz’s theory and offers political and military support. But, it has also enforced its 
policies more stringent in recent years than ever in the past 150 years on the international 
level. These actions can be bilateral, for example by issuing a warning (in-) directly towards 
the United States to stay out of East Asia65, or in the United Nations, where Beijing regularly 
opposes UN resolutions submitted by Western countries.  
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The character of the units 
Preferences 
Domestic systems are hierarchically structured and units fulfill their predetermined 
functions. After all, each state has institutions that set or execute laws. Each state has a police 
force to ensure public order and usually they also educate their people. However, Waltz points 
out that many students and scholars of international politics get this point wrong when 
analyzing the system. He insists that  
“concern for tradition and culture, analysis of the character and personality of 
political actors, consideration of the conflictive and accommodative processes 
of politics, description of the making and execution of policy – all such matters 
are left aside. Their omission does not imply their unimportance. They are 
omitted because we want to figure out the expected effects of structure on 
process and of process on structure. That can be done only if structure and 
process are distinctly defined.”66  
Therefore, the units in Waltz’ international system only have two characteristics. First, 
they are sovereign and decide freely what to do. And second, the internal structure of the units 
does not matter because they are all similar, as they fulfill the same tasks. What matters is 
how they respond to other units’ behavior. This all sounds nice, but since Waltz is comparing 
his system to the market, where agents pursue the bundle of goods that gives them the highest 
utility, which in turn means that states purse the policies that give them the highest utility, we 
have to ask “the question”: How do differences between states’ goals and actions arise? After 
all, since it is a country’s political leaders that set the course of action, a change in their 
preferences leads to states having more (or less) in common.  
Waltz does not explain how the units in his system determine their behavior and he 
tells us that it does not matter whether a country is a short-term maximizer who seeks to 
overpower the opponent immediately, or whether it underuses its power now in order to be in 
a stronger position in the future. States are alike in deciding their response to other state’s 
actions. They will act according to their relative strengths. And, however their actions look 
like, he would add, the most basic principle is always the same: Stay in the game and survive. 
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Therefore, the biggest challenge thrown at Waltz and Neorealism is aimed at the 
negligence of the importance of the character of the units as Owen argues that the most 
common change in preferences happens through a governmental change.67 Did Hitler’s rise 
not alter Germany’s foreign policy? And while one president might favor military action to 
the make his points clear, the other might prefer talks over bombs. Therefore, it has to be true 
that “ideologies shape state response.”68 
Ideas & values 
But how is a state’s course of action determined? How come two leaders of nations 
that are perceived to be equally strong decide differently on the same issue when (neo-) realist 
theory tells us that states would behave only according to their relative strengths? While 
Grieco states that international anarchy shapes states actions and motives,69 Rosecrance and 
Owen, show that the character of the units matters if we want to figure out why states do what 
they do since “one cannot predict a country’s course of action by [only] knowing the amount 
of power it possesses”.70 Rosecrance points out, that it is not only the structure of a unit that 
shapes its preferences, but that states also have natural limitations such as their geographical 
position and their size that influence their preferences. An island state, he argues, has different 
(maybe additional) security concerns that a land state. 71  
A country, such as Switzerland, has, due to its mountainous geography, vastly 
different security concerns compared to, for example, Hungary. Furthermore, demographics 
and the size of a country also play a role in her considerations. Switzerland will never be able 
to out-produce Germany. But Germany will most likely never attack Switzerland despite 
being militarily stronger. At some point, given its path of growth and the current political 
stability, China has to become the country that produces the most. Besides the United States 
the only challenger one can think of is India. And even then, the race would be decided by 
who can reach a higher productivity level and maintain stronger military forces. 
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Owen argues that “under some conditions a change in domestic constitution is 
followed closely by a change in external alignment”72 as this transformation can alter the 
goals and actions of a state. A state might transform from a monarchy to a democracy or a 
dictatorship. It might also switch from a communist state to a capitalist one like Russia did. 
When Austria was established as the successor of the Habsburg monarchy, it had different 
political goals than its predecessor. The formation of the United States (of America) had a 
significant impact on world politics as well. Before that London told the American provinces 
what they had to do. With the creation of the U.S., the British Empire faced a new competitor, 
which has become the world’s strongest nation about 150 years later. 
A change in leadership can lead to changes in foreign policy as well because leaders 
tend to have their own opinion about what do to and who to side with. Furthermore, political 
leaders advocate different ideologies that they impose on their country. This can mean that 
even though two countries were allies for a significant period of time, face political tensions 
now because the leader of country A has a different approach than his predecessor. Owen 
writes that “if variations in leadership were inconsequential to foreign policy, then 
governments would not need to pay much attention to who led other countries, at least as far 
as security was concerned.”73While the rise of Hitler and National Socialism is a special case 
– its emergence did not only cause a change in the domestic constitution, but also a change in 
leadership - preferred external expansion, the Chamberlain sought to expand his country 
through internal efforts.  
Another example is the death of Kim Jong-Il which caused much concern about who 
will be the successor. As we know, the world was alerted when Kim died. Mark E. Manyin, a 
Specialist in Asian Affairs of the U.S. Congressional Research Service encapsulated the 
world’s concerns when he wrote that  
“The effect of Kim Jong-Il’s death on North Korea’s stability is uncertain. 
Many experts doubt that his anointed successor, his third son Kim Jong-Un, 
will over the course of time be able to maintain effective control over his 
country due to his relative inexperience and the mounting internal and external 
pressures confronting North Korea.”74 
Hence, we can see that it matters who runs a country. 
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Even though leaders (officially) decide a country’s actions, Hellen Milner shows that 
social groups such as labor organizations, ethnic groups or multi-national corporations put 
“pressure on policymakers to orient their policies in this [their] direction”.75 In this sense, the 
national unity of a state is therefore also of concern to rulers both at home and abroad. If 
cohesion is low in a country, the government will find it more difficult to pursue its goals. 
Therefore, as Owen states, “the rule would apply most in constitutional democracies, where 
dissent against the government, if not the regime, is tolerated and allowed to spread.”76  
For example, the Chinese government is battling the spread of information and 
personal freedom in order to prevent riots in provinces such as Tibet, where its approval rates 
are very low. If public opinion could be expressed more freely, the government would 
possibly have to alter its political approach and focus on other things such as human rights as 
well – or at least more than it has done so far. On the other side, foreign governments do care 
about stability as well because a military coup or a civil war can alter the situation completely. 
SUMMARY 
States operate within a closed system. Waltz considers the world to be the systems’ 
framework within which the states (=units) interact with each other. He prefers a systems 
theory because it “explain(s) why different units (nations) behave similarly and, despite their 
variations, produce outcomes that fall within expected ranges.”77 Being in a closed system 
means that no one can enter and no one can leave the system. States may reduce their 
diplomatic ties with others to a minimum (or stop talking to them at all), but that does not 
mean that they are not participating in the system anymore.  
The only way a state can leave the system is if it does not exist anymore. As a 
consequence, the power alignment in the system can change. Either one or more states inhabit 
the territory or one or more states are created. Cases can be found in the Habsburg Monarchy, 
the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia out of which new states have arisen. And these nations act 
according to the same principles as their predecessors did. Each of them looks after itself and 
they seek to remain independent and play an important role (if not worldwide, at least 
regionally). 
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Not anarchy itself structures the system but the capabilities of the states do. The 
former, in neorealist terms, merely means that there is no “agent” that tells each state what to 
do and thereby order the system hierarchically. And since there is no one to watch states, trust 
between them is usually very low to non-existent. This in turn leads Waltz to the conclusion 
that states prefer to look after themselves first before helping anyone else. As a result of this 
environment of uncertainty, states pursue a survival-first strategy before focusing on other 
goals – leaving aside that some states prefer something else more than survival. It is namely 
that only the great powers of a system determine the structure because state behavior is 
explained through their capabilities. According to the theory, if leaders are not insane, states 
are better in doing things the more resources they are able to amass. Consequently, states who 
do so, will be ranked higher in the long run. 
For example, the United States have economic and military strength second to none. 
Their capabilities are their source of power and allow them to influence politics in other parts 
of the world through military and political power. In turn, the weaker – and therefore less 
important – states have no voice. They set their goals according to how the great powers in 
the system let them. And unless they are in fear of losing their autonomy, weaker states will 
do so. This is why Waltz claims that the internal composition of state does not matter because 
states have the same needs. A weaker state does not want to be conquered and a stronger state 
does not want any other state to take its rank. In this sense, great powers seek to maintain a 
balance that favors their needs. As Waltz notes, if that system is being threatened either by a 
nation attempting to rise or by a great nation trying to become the hegemon, other nations will 
fight a war to prevent this imbalance.78 
But how do we know whether a system is stable or not? Waltz argues that a smaller 
number of great powers is rather preferred because then, states are limited in their actions to 
gang up against each other. Waltz denies the general assumption that a balance-of-power 
theory “requires [at least] three or more players…for in a two—power system the politics of 
balance continue, but the way to compensate for an incipient external disequilibrium is 
primarily by intensifying one’s internal efforts.”79 Therefore, his optimal number of great 
powers is two which means that once we have reached a duopolistic structure balancing 
between the two powers takes place internally and that their interdependence very low 
because neither depends militarily, economically nor politically on the other. 
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Waltz also argues that the internal balancing is more “reliable and precise than 
external balancing”80 because states cannot misjudge other powers actions, but only overreact. 
However, full stability is never guaranteed in any system because states (or better, there 
decision makers) still can mess things up. Waltz explains this through a flexibility of the 
system which means that “where one or more states threaten others, some states will join one 
side or defect from the other in order to tilt the balance against the would-be aggressors.”81 
In the end, no matter how large the number of great states, the system will tend towards 
equilibrium. But, if in an alliance (or cooperation), a nation questions the willingness of the 
others to fulfill the commitments. 
Waltz further argues that the reason lies with the fact that within an alliance the 
stronger nation enjoys more privileges than weaker. This can be observed regularly in the 
European Union, where large and more powerful nations such as Germany, France or Great 
Britain negotiate deals that might meet their goals and needs more than that of the EU. While 
for realists failed cooperation results in a war (nuclear war in the worst case), the worst case 
scenario for neoliberal “is a lost opportunity”.82  
Interestingly, Keohane criticizes that Waltz misses to show under what conditions 
change in the coalitions take place and only “forecasts that balances of power will 
periodically recur.”83 However, as I have shown above, Waltz does not want to do more than 
forecast what happens under certain conditions. He does not try to explain why it happens. He 
simply claims that all states, because of their similar (basic) needs, will respond in the same 
way to threats no matter how their internal structure looks like. If states are in fear of losing 
their autonomy or of becoming extinct, they will turn to military force to prevent this scenario. 
And states can only act according to their relative strength. 
If in a war, a state with limited economic abilities will be constrained in its military 
operations. Therefore, larger nations have the advantage over smaller ones that their economic 
resources are larger, which in turn means that they are less dependent (or not at all) on their 
partners whom they distrust anyway. However, even the greatest nations have their limits. 
Once a nation becomes too dominant, the rest of the world – or at least those who would 
benefit most from it – will (try to) counterbalance the strongest.  
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Because of this, Gilpin, who, like Waltz, considers nations to strive for hegemony, concludes 
that  
“the conclusion of one hegemonic war is the beginning of another cycle of 
growth, expansion, and eventual decline. The law of uneven growth continues 
to redistribute power, thus undermining the status quo established by the last 
hegemonic struggle. Disequilibrium replaces equilibrium, and the world moves 
toward a new round of hegemonic conflict.”84 
Table 1 below shows the factors that are of importance to a country if it wants to be 
counted as a great power in the Waltzian system. For Waltz, a great power has to have 
developed all the areas in the table. It has to be economically strong, be able to protect its turf 
and also, if needed, enforce its political will with military means. Furthermore, this nation has 
to have the capabilities to bind others to itself in order to protect itself from its main 
competitors. Therefore, it will be the task of the next chapter to find out where China stands in 
Waltz’s system. Is the People’s Republic already a great nation, or is it on the way to become 
a great nation? This will be important as we want to find out the system’s structure. 
Furthermore, I will look at the unit level and investigate the three aspects Waltz has 
defined as important for any country to be a great power. The question that arises is about the 
“real” strength of the Chinese economy. Where does China’s strength come from and why are 
people all over the world, and especially in the United States, concerned with it emergence? 
Also of interest will be whether the Chinese economy is really as strong as it looks like, or 
whether statistics blur the picture.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
84 Gilpin, War and Change, p.210 
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85 Waltz, Theory, p.118 
Table 1: Capabilities 
External factors Internal factors 
Strengthen and enlarge own alliances to 
weaken the opposition 
-> make weaker neighbors dependent (e.g. 
Warsaw Pact) 
 
Economic development 
-> GDP growth* 
-> increase productivity* 
-> maximize labor supply* 
-> develop domestic market* 
-> attract FDI* 
Expand military strength 
-> Nuclear weapons* 
-> expand army* 
-> build offensive and defensive tactical 
weapon systems* 
Develop strategies 
-> how to promote economic growth 
-> to keep population “happy” 
major points in bold are form Waltz85, examples with * are my own examples 
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CHAPTER 2 – CHINA’S EMERGENCE 
This chapter assesses China’s position in the neorealist system. In order to do so, we 
have to look at how her economic and military capabilities relative to those of other nations 
have developed since 1990. Lucky for this paper, the fall of the Soviet Union has left the 
United States as the only great power in the world which means that any analysis starting 
right after the fall of the iron curtain will be in a hegemonic world system. At the end of this 
chapter I will try to give an answer to the most important question: What type of system have 
we been in since 1990 and how has the alignment changed since? 
It is of paramount importance for any (neo-) realist analysis to know whether the 
system has stayed in a hegemonic alignment for the past twenty-some years or whether there 
has been a change towards a duopolistic, or even a multipolar system. This is because, as 
already laid out in the first chapter, we need to know who runs things. As Waltz and other 
have shown, it is the great powers that dictate the course of action. And the higher a country is 
ranked relative to others, the more influence it will have. However, it is of importance for this 
paper to assess the “East-Asian system” as well as I will focus on parts of this region later on. 
The first part on China’s rise will deal with the economic and political development of 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since its foundation by Mao Zedong in 1949. It will be 
a mix of historical review and an overview of the most important policies that characterized 
China’s development and, at the same time, allowed the Communist Party to remain in power. 
It is important to start with the analysis in 1949 as it helps to show two things. First, contrary 
to Waltz’s claim, domestic characteristics actually seem to matter. After all, China’s rise from 
a poor and politically isolated country to an influential power in the world has its roots in the 
ability of the Communist Party to run it.  
Second, in the 1970s policy makers have moved away from Soviet government style 
and later from the Maoist approach as well. They have realized that only an intraparty drift 
towards a market economy can assure domestic political stability in both, the short and long 
run. Consequently, the assumed political framework has helped China to develop its 
economic capabilities and subsequently political strategies on the international level at well.86 
I will divide the period since 1949 into two sections, the Planning Era (1949-1978) and into 
                                                 
86 Joseph Nye, Has Economic Power Replaced Military Might?, In: CNN Online (06.06.2011). Online: 
http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/06/06/has-economic-power-replaced-military-
might/?iref=allsearch (accessed: 22.04.2012) 
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what I call the Reform Era (1978-2008). While I will rather giver a historical overview of the 
first, I will focus on China’s capabilities during the latter and lay the foundation for the 
assessment of China’s position at the end of this chapter. Concerning China’s economic 
capabilities I will limit my analysis to the most important policies the central government 
implemented to get China’s transition started. I will also elaborate on China’s commitments 
made to be granted accession to the WTO. In the section on the political capabilities I will 
briefly focus on three things.  
First, I will return to China’s WTO accession and dwell on how the Chinese 
commitments can be seen in terms of political power relative to other countries, especially the 
United States. Then, I will take a short detour and spend some time on the return of Hong 
Kong because I this to be a good example to show that while China’s political strength did not 
suffice in the WTO matter, it did to convince the British to return Hong Kong peacefully. The 
topic also illustrates China’s increasing self- confidence that has undergone significant change 
during the past thirty years. Today, China more regularly expresses its demands more openly 
towards others, including the United States, than ever before. In the military section I will 
focus on China’s modernization programs and operational goals and how these relate to 
China’s perception of a world order. 
The second part of this chapter will focus on determining China’s position in the 
system. Here, I will employ a macro-to-micro level approach, by first determining China’s 
position in the world and then in (South-) East Asia where Japan quickly became the most 
important player after World War II again - but this time as a democracy. Therefore, we need 
to compare her economic and military capabilities with those of the United States in order to 
determine her position in the world. I will do so because economic and military strength gives 
a country a considerable bargaining advantage and makes its demands (or orders?) very 
convincing for others. Furthermore, an economically strong87 nation can afford to uphold 
relative large military forces and also equip them with modern weapon systems. 
 
                                                 
87 I assume, that economically strong implies that the country also has a certain size because small countries such 
as Singapore and Taiwan might be economic powerhouses but they lack the population to maintain a significant 
number of military personnel, which means that they depend on their allies to protect them if need be. 
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This in turn allows it to carry out its political operations by other means. 88 
Nevertheless, it shall be noted shortly at this point that, considering the vast resources 
available, India might one day become a member of the “great power society” as well if it 
keeps developing its capabilities. However, as Nye has pointed out, India still has a long way 
to go before I will close the gap to China. Nevertheless, India has what Nye calls “hard-power 
resources” with significant financial assets focused on military investment. On the other side, 
India lags behind in many economic aspects and education, which will take India at least the 
next decade or two to be able to challenge China.89 
For the regional assessment I will use the same data as in the world section. However, 
I will add Japan and Vietnam so that the relative power relations of all four countries can be 
determined. The reason the United States is being considered is that it is considered to be the 
hegemon in the world system and therefore has an influence everywhere. A second reason, 
besides assessing relative strength, I am performing this inquiry is also in order to test John 
Mearsheimer’s statement about hegemony who claims, in contrast to Waltz, that there will 
never be a global hegemon because no country – not even the United States – has the 
resources to unfold its power everywhere in world at the same time. Rather we should 
consider the world to have regional hegemons instead of global ones as, in his opinion,  
“the United States, which dominates the Western Hemisphere, is the only 
regional hegemon in modern history. Five other great powers have tried to 
dominate their region—Napoleonic France, Imperial Germany, Imperial 
Japan, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union—but none have succeeded.”90 
Assuming that Mearsheimer is right, his concept of the United States being the “Western 
Hemisphere hegemon” might be fragile. 
After all, U.S. power, like the power of all other countries, is ultimately based on 
military strength. Even though the U.S. cannot unfold its power everywhere at the same time, 
and even though in 2012 the President announced that there is no need for the military to be 
capable of fighting two wars at the same time91, the U.S. can still shift its military power 
quicker and more comprehensively than any other country. This means if the U.S. move their 
major capabilities to a conflict zone outside the Western Hemisphere, it will not be the 
                                                 
88 Karl von Clausewitz, On War. In: Sun Tzu, Karl von Clausewitz, The Book of War. Sun-Tzu's "The Art of 
War" & Karl von Clausewitz's "On War" (New York, 2000), p.280 
89 Joseph Nye, Asia in the Balance. In: The Korea Times online (12.01.2011). Online: 
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90 Mearsheimer, The Gathering Storm, p.387f 
91 BBC News, Obama unveils new strategy for 'leaner' US military (05.01.2012). Online: 
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regional hegemon in that region anymore but somewhere else – at least if Mearsheimer’s 
opinion mentioned above was correct. But this, in turn, would not make any sense.  
I would rather suggest that we consider the country a global hegemon that possesses 
the capabilities to concentrate its forces within a relatively short period of time to create an 
overbalance in its favor. After all, the United States possesses exactly this capability with its 
global network of military bases and its carrier groups that can be at any place in the world 
within days. On the other side, a regional hegemon should be a country that is the most 
powerful within its geographical region. For example, if Germany was the most powerful 
country among the EU member states, I would suggest calling it the regional hegemon. This 
would also be true for France or Great Britain, for example. However, the United States 
would still be the global hegemon because its power outside its geographical region is so 
significant, that it could overpower Germany in Europe if it wanted. The same would be true 
for Japan or China in Asia, of course.  
The last part of this chapter focuses on the main issues one should always keep in 
mind when analyzing China. One is about how to assess economic strength. Today, GDP 
indicators are the most commonly used economic indicators to assess a country’s performance. 
But there is sound disagreement about which indicator to use. Furthermore, there is a dispute 
among business leaders and economists whether or not China’s economy is a threat to the 
American economy by attracting more and more technologically advanced goods. The third 
issue that I will raise is about official data released by the government. It seems that the 
Chinese twist their own data in their favor whenever they deem it advantageous. 
In my opinion, all these efforts are necessary in order to answer the question I have 
stated above: What kind of (world) system are we in? Is the United States still the only super 
power in the world, or has China already assumed the position of a second “great power”, 
similar to the Soviet Union before its collapse? If so, this would mean that that we are living 
in a duopolistic world system. The second option, as already laid out in Chapter 1, would be 
that nothing has changed in terms of the alignment of the states among each other and that 
Washington has successfully managed to maintain its hegemonic position in the world. The 
third possibility, of course, would be that we reached a multipolar stage with many main 
actors shaping the environment and limiting other countries actions. 
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Based on Layne’s assessment of the situation that after “the Soviet Union’s 
disappearance, no other great power has emerged to challenge U.S. preponderance”92, I 
assume that the last array of the states did not evolve and that we have not, at any point since 
1990, lived in a multipolar world. This assumption seems plausible because there has been no 
other country that has managed to perform international operations (military and political) as 
the United States did (without the support of others). Washington has resolved wars, such as 
the one in Yugoslavia, and has performed numerous military operations around the world. 
Furthermore, the U.S. has been a political heavy weight and influences politics in many 
countries through, for example, foreign aid or trade agreements. Arm sales to Taiwan and 
many countries around the globe also ensure the respective country’s “loyalty” when asked 
upon. 
 
During the Planning Era (1949 – 1978) 
From 1949 on, when the Communist Party imbibed political power after the successful 
revolution, Mao, who called the CCP victory “the culmination of a 100-year struggle against 
imperialism (dating from the Opium War)”93, gradually abandoned his strategy about the 
“new democratic society”, which he had proclaimed in 1940, to borrow the theory of 
proletarian dictatorship from Lenin to rule the country.94 With the success of the Communist 
Party decision making was, much like in the Soviet Union based on ideology. However, 
China’s transition from capitalism to socialism was marked by sharp turns in politics since 
then. The socialist experiments imposed on the Chinese economy, and much more on the 
Chinese people themselves, show that during what Naughton calls the “Socialist Era” 
“successive periods of rapid investment growth, followed by slower growth or even 
decline.”95 
In 1953, the first 5-year plan was implemented with significant Soviet support. The 
goal was not only to transform China’s society from a capitalist and imperialistic one into a 
socialist society, but also to figure out how fast this can be achieved and how much central 
power could be borne by the economy. Private enterprises that were protected until then fell 
                                                 
92 Christopher Layne, The Unipolar Illusion Revisited. The Coming End of the United States’ Unipolar Moment. 
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93 Bailey, China, p.144 
94 Yu Guangyuan, China’s reform in the past twenty-three years. In: Tian Yu Cao (ed.), The Chinese Model of 
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victim to a process of nationalization and heavy industry was promoted with help from 
Moscow. Furthermore, the Soviets provided financial support as well as technicians to train 
their Chinese colleagues.96 
While the 1950s where characterized by Soviet influence and radicalism, the first 
started to vanish from Chinese politics when Mao announced the Great Leap Forward (GLF), 
which “was dominated by a highly politicized intoxication with growth that envisaged a bold 
leap toward a fully communistic society with a few years.” 97  The GLF led to the 
collectivization of rural Chinese into communes, the closure of the free market, and the 
introduction of material incentives (while monetary rewards where abolished). Furthermore, 
economic decision-making was decentralized and numbers were now reported “by the cadres 
in the field according to their "enthusiasm in socialist revolution" rather than on the basis of 
fact.”98 In addition, Mao initiated an “Anti-Rightist Campaign” that targeted intellectuals and 
others not associated with the party was initiated.99 In the end, the GLF was, mildly spoken, 
an economic and human disaster. The reassignment of roughly 30 million workers to the 
industrial sector led to their missing in agriculture. It should be to no surprise that this focus 
on the heavy industry caused shortages in the food supply which in turn triggered a three year 
famine that peaked between 1961 and 1962.  
These developments were mostly caused by the “arbitrary directions given by the 
central authorities…[who set targets] without any considerations given to their sources of raw 
materials and their technological requirements”100 to impress higher ranked officials. In the 
end, the GLF is said to have claimed between 18 and 45 million lives.101 As a result of the 
famine and the economic contraction of 27% (of GDP) in 1961 compared to 1960, and 
another 6% between 1961 and 1962102, the Central Government quickly sent many workers 
back to the countryside, where they were needed the most, to solve the food supply problem. 
Looking at data, the inefficiency becomes obvious as the value added (% of GDP) of the 
industrial sector fell below that of agriculture and the service sector, despite the above 
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mentioned focus on the industry at the expense of the other two sectors103, but little incentives, 
a backward technology, and poor planning led to high inefficiencies and costs. 
With the restructuring of the economy - the government freed markets a little so that 
people could buy (more) food again and focused on improving efficiency, leading to a 
significant shutdown of smaller, inefficient factories. GDP picked up again and the “Third 
Front Initiative“(TFI) could be initiated in 1963 “to create an entire industrial base that 
would provide China with strategic independence” 104  in the Southwest and other inland 
provinces that would be sheltered in the event of an attack on China. The TFI did not only aim 
to support the economy to recover from the GLF, but was also an initiative based on the 
assumption that World War III was around the corner.105 The deterioration of the relationship 
with Soviet Russia did not only cause a significant loss of intellectual capabilities when 
Russian technicians suddenly returned home, and cut off China’s planners from the only 
exterior source of information and knowledge, but also resulted in the loss of military 
protection – including Soviet nuclear weapons – against other threats. Therefore, Beijing had 
to pay twice for the fallout with Moscow when it chose a different (economic) path. 
With the promotion of the Third Front Initiative, the government hoped to at least 
ensure Chinese self-sufficiency in an increasingly “dangerous international environment after 
the split with the Soviet Union”, and the increasing military presence of U.S. troops in South 
Asia in general and Vietnam in particular. 106  Furthermore, the creation of a heavy steel 
industry in remote areas that were deemed safe allowed factories to produce armored vehicles 
and missiles as well, which was a contrast Mao’s official approach to fight a “people’s war” 
with infantrymen and guerillas.107 However, the entire plan turned out to be too costly as 
building factories far away from the economic centers on the coast in hard-to-reach areas did 
not only increase construction costs, but also transportation costs of the respective output. 
The launch of the Cultural Revolution Era in 1966 overlapped with the Third Front 
Initiative. Even though the Cultural Revolution itself lasted only for three years (1966-1969), 
its impact was felt until after Mao’s death in 1976. The Cultural Revolution differed in two 
points from the GLF. First, its focus was on turning the Communist Party upside down and 
rebuild it from scratch. In an attempt to restore his own power and to revive the socialist spirit 
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in the country Mao launched cultural campaign that were carried out mostly with the help of 
Red Guard units which had formed throughout the country after Mao publicly endorsed them 
at a rally in Tiananmen Square.108 
In order to get rid of many prominent adversaries (among them Deng Xiaoping) within 
the Communist Party, as well as intellectuals and others that criticized the party, these 
organization were given the order to  
“travel around the country (often being given free rail passes) exchanging 
revolutionary experiences and to ‘bombard the headquarters’ of local and 
regional party organizations… [which meant that] …anarchy and violence 
became the order of the day”109  
and that everyone deemed anti-socialist was in jeopardy. Furthermore, China’s political 
isolation climaxed during the Cultural Revolution as political bonds with many countries were 
broken off and cooperation with both, the Soviet Union and the United States was declared 
impossible as the first was too revisionist and the latter (too) imperialist to be a worthy partner. 
Second, the focus of economic development remained on the third front. This is 
because of the isolated political situation Mao maneuvered China into. With China standing 
alone, as already mentioned above, it tried to build up an industry that would make it self-
sufficient. Investment in the TFI - regions remained very high as the third FYP (Five Year 
Plan) assigned a 52.7% and the fourth FYP still 41.1% of National Investment to TFI areas110. 
This would not change until 1978, when political leaders realized that efficiency was to be 
placed above regional equality. 111  And even though Naughton states that the Cultural 
Revolution per se was “from an economic standpoint,…, not a particularly important 
event”112, the impact of relatively highly inefficient projects and the repercussions of the 
Cultural Revolution caused economic growth to turn from 10.7% (1966) to -5.7% (1967) and 
-4.1% (1968) with per capita income declining even faster .113 
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Nevertheless, the central planners seemed to have used their knowledge accumulated 
during the Great Leap Forward as at least food supply could be maintained for the next couple 
of years. While planners stuck to the most basic principles of economic planning towards a 
socialist society - namely first, planned labor allocation among the economy’s sectors and that 
second, investment priority is given to the heavy industry at the expense of the light industry 
and consumption114 - it was the “cultural disruptions” this time, caused by the Red Guards 
and other revolutionary associations, that disrupted economic growth.  
While the Cultural Revolution did not starve anyone to death, it militarized China’s 
society when Mao called the PLA to suppress the Red Guard movement. Subsequently, PLA 
leaders managed to take on important positions within the party and spread their influence 
into the factories and villages. Mao saw this as an opportunity to lay out his next plan in 1970, 
when he wanted some GLF efforts to be revived. However, the plan of limited cooperation 
with the world, a focus on further developing the third front under PLA supervision, complete 
absence of material incentive and further government-directed labor allocation already caused 
serious problems in the following year as the industrial sector grew faster than the agricultural. 
As a result, the assumption that more labor means more output in connection with the 
emphasis on industrial development caused food supply problems again.  
After the Red Guards threat was eliminated by the PLA, Mao was in fear that his army 
leaders might become his biggest concern. To counterbalance this development, he 
rehabilitated many of the cadre people that were ousted during the Cultural Revolution and 
eliminated some of Lin Biao’s comrades from military posts. Lin Bao turned out to be Mao’s 
main opponent in the struggle for power, as he took the opposite in many matters. Concerning 
foreign policy, for example, he argued contrary to Mao that “opposition to U.S. imperialism 
should be the cornerstone of China’s foreign policy.” 115 Mao also initiated China’s 
participation in the world to some extend when it was admitted into the United Nations in 
1971. Here, again, Lin opposed the move as he opted for an isolationist policy. In the end Lin 
Biao died in a plane crash the following year after being totally isolated from Chinese politics. 
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On the other side, Mao’s swing towards the imperialist United States China did not 
only increase China’s trade with world markets - the value of trade as share of GDP increased 
from 5.3% in 1970 to over 10% in 1974 and above 9% in 1976116 - but also triggered a new 
fierce struggle between radicals (Gang of Four) and pragmatists for power when his 
deteriorating health took him out of the political game until his death. In the end the 
pragmatists around Premier Zhou Enlai prevailed, when the “Great Leap Outward” (GLO) 
under Hua Guofeng failed. The GLO was first based on faulty calculations, which, for 
example, resulted in oil production being insufficiently small in order to pay for the 
equipment that the government needed117, and second too ambitious for the economy, which 
was never able to meet the quotas. With the help of Zhou Enlai Deng Xiaoping was 
rehabilitated while the Gang of Four was expelled in 1976. 
Summary 1949-1978 
The period from 1949 until 1978 was marked on the one side by trench warfare 
between the rivaling groups within the CCP. During this time Mao had to transform his power 
basis regularly in order to remain at the top. On the other side, from an economic point of 
view, this era proved to be one of trial and error under the condition to stay within “socialist 
premises” when planning. The focus lay on industrializing the country. And in order to 
achieve that, virtually all resources where used for the heavy industry. This, in turn, caused 
significant shortcomings in agriculture and barely an improvement in income and living 
standards. At the eve of the reforms, China was still a poor and underdeveloped country that 
was mainly isolated from the rest of the world. Despite several efforts, the government was 
not able to develop China’s capabilities. The People’s Republic was economically weak, 
politically torn apart and militarily no match for neither, the Soviet Union or the United States. 
 
Reform Era and beyond (1978 – 2008) 
While every decision was based on political principles during Mao’s reign, this 
changed after his death. The reform era is thus important as it opened China to, and integrated 
it into the world. Since 1978 China, and especially since China’s accession to the WTO, the 
country has experienced growth in many areas that most other countries could only dream of. 
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It was the combination of politicians realizing that opening the economy and increasing 
people’s living standards would lay the foundation to secure the CCP’s long term survival. 
Even though political and military leaders had to give up some of their goals, it would also 
allow China to upgrade its military capabilities in the future and give the country a chance to 
assume its entitled position: to be the center of the world –again. 
Economic Capabilities 
With Mao dead and the old cadres, which were sacrificed during the Cultural 
Revolution to establish the socialist state, back in charge, China entered a phase of reform in 
1978. Long story short, Deng Xiaoping became the new strong man in China and he and the 
other leaders realized that if China wanted to assume its righteous place in the world it would 
have to undergo significant reforms in almost every aspect of the economy. They also 
understood that if they wanted to secure the party’s power position the transition process had 
to be gradual, decentralized and liberalizing. Lin makes the point that Chinese leaders did not 
follow a worked out plan now but rather followed logic to transform the highly inefficient 
economic structure that had arisen from “structural imbalances and incentive problems.”118 
New Patronage System 
Naughton argues that the regime had to create a new political patronage system that 
would tie new groups, which were interested in the rewards that the transformation would 
bring them in turn for their allegiance, to the apparatus.119 Loyalists would receive patronage 
in multiple ways from their leaders as these try to fill influential positions in SOEs and the 
political apparatus with their followers.120 The first bold reforms were initiated in rural areas, 
where the agricultural sector was the target of change. This was first, because incomes in rural 
areas where much lower than in urban areas. Consequently, rural areas had only limited 
influence in the political system.  
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Furthermore, Naughton also points out, “there were no powerful agricultural interest 
groups in the government, so central leaders were free to recast agricultural policy 
pragmatically.” 121 And second, because the government feared that the poor state of the 
sector might cause another famine, as Maoist policies squeezed farmers into a very 
disadvantageous deal – they had to meet high targets while prices were kept low. Therefore, 
the government started to implement changes of the economic environment without the 
intention of institutional change. It took pressure off them by relaxing the quotas, raising 
prices – especially those prices for “deliveries above the procurement target were raised 
dramatically” and the return of family farming.122 The government liberalized the agricultural 
sector at the expense of technology imports targeted in the “leap outward”.123  
Reforms 
In addition to that, the government allowed enterprises to become more independent. 
This relaxation favored especially TVEs, which were given the freedom to experiment with 
the allocation of land among its farmers, but also put additional pressure on the planning 
system.124 In the end and despite not being intended by central planners, these reforms would 
lead to a spread of the household responsibility system. Naughton points out that not only the 
prospect of administering one’s own land, but enterprise autonomy and profit retention as 
well made it very popular among the population. 125  Lin shows that participation in the 
household responsibility system picked up relatively slowly the beginning, but spread very 
fast once people were assured that the system was granted political support from the top. 
Consequently, 45% of production units had adopted the household responsibility system in 
1981 and in 1983 the share was 99%.126 Labor supply increased due to the reforms in the 
organizational structure of TVE. 
Subsequently, the government had to find a way to create jobs for the millions that 
were not needed in the agricultural sector anymore. The answer lay in the labor intensive 
manufacturing industry. In 1978, over 70% of the people where employed in the primary 
sector. Ten years later, the number was down to 59% while at the same time the industrial 
sector gained about 6% to account for 22.4% in 1988. Consequently, a significant amount of 
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people transferred to the service sector. By 2000, the share of people working in the 
agricultural sector had declined to 50% already and the service sector employed over 27%.127 
Since the WTO accession the Chinese government has increased efforts to incentivize 
By continuously unleashing prices and allowing the market “to grow out of the 
plan”128the government created important incentives for companies and individuals alike to 
increase production. In 1978, 6% of farm products were sold at market prices and their shares 
would skyrocket to 40% in 1985 and 58% in 1991, while the share of state-fixed prices would 
decline from 97% to 22% during the same period of time.129 Furthermore, while prices where 
set by the government for producer goods in 1978, in 1985 13%, and in 1991 46% of the 
goods were sold at market prices, and the share of state-fixed prices declined to 36% over the 
same period of time.130 
A similar development took place in retail sales. In 1978 3% of transactions were 
made at market prices while 97% were made at state-set prices. In 1991, already 69% of the 
transactions were made at market prices. These numbers continued their dramatic change; in 
2003, 87.3% of producer goods, 96.1% of retail goods and 96.5% of agricultural goods were 
sold based on market prices.131 With the transition of prices from a planned to a market 
oriented determination, Foreign Trade Companies (FTC) more and more paid the world 
market price for imported goods. In the next step the FTC sold the good to a local company at 
the domestic price. The difference between revenue and cost would be transferred to the 
government as either profit or, in case the FTC was loss-making, as a subsidy.132  
Despite China’s significant resources the government faced a shortage in financial 
supply to fund economic modernization. The discrepancy between the financial resources 
available and those needed was simply too large for the government to handle it with 
domestic resources. Consequently, obtaining external funds was crucial to China’s 
modernization. Foreign borrowing became most important “for those projects either with 
export potential or with the capacity to produce goods that could serve as import 
substitutes.”133 Most of the external resources needed came from Commercial Borrowing. 
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Institutional funding such as IMF-loans were short-term only and of relatively little volume 
during the 1980s.134  
In order to channel foreign investment, the government created so called Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs) which incentivized foreign investment by offering lower tax rates, 
greater ease of access to China, and duty-free imports for those who were willing to invest. 
Furthermore creating these SEZs was in accordance with Chines policy making during the 
reform period.135 Especially the creation of the SEZs and other investment areas helped China 
to attract massive foreign investment and their number was subsequently raised over the years 
so that by 2003 their number exceeded 100.136 
Further important reforms were made in the trade sector. While trade was only seen as 
a necessary evil to finance the country’s self-sufficiency before 1978, Chai points out that “it 
was now seen as augmenting domestic resources and as providing an additional source for 
rapid economic growth through the realization of static and dynamic gains of trade. Hence, 
trade was to be maximized whenever possible.” 137  In addition to relaxing prices the 
government loosened limitations on trading rights. The number of licenses to conduct foreign 
trade given to Chinese companies was widened immensely from 12 in 1978 to 800 in 1985 to 
over 5,000 in 1988.138 
When China accessed to the WTO, the country had already roughly 35,000 companies 
that were allowed to engage in the import/export business139 In order to increase trade the 
government realized that transferring commodities to the market.140 The government also had 
to bring down barriers which had been established during the Maoist Era to protect domestic 
industries. While tariffs on imports had little to no effect during the planning era, the state 
introduced “high tariffs for many products and adjusted tariffs upward on others.”141 Lardy 
has calculated that these tariffs were around 55% on average in 1982 but where gradually 
reduced to 15% in 2001.142 China began reducing tariffs in two sectors that were crucial to the 
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government’s plan: Raw materials that the country was short of and intermediate goods that 
could be re-exported as assembled goods (e.g. cars).  
On the non-tariff side import licenses, quotas and limits on trading rights were the 
most important barriers to trade. While the first two (introduced in the early 1980s) were 
usually seen as trade-averse policies, Lardy points out that in China’s case their introduction 
were actually steps towards free trade.143 On the export side the government reestablished the 
licensing and quota system again in order to control the outflow of important commodities 
that it thought it had market power in and to control the outflow of goods that were still 
underpriced on the domestic market. However, like with imports, export controls were 
reduced gradually until the end of the 1990s.144 
Furthermore, turning to trade and letting foreign and domestic prices move close 
together could also help to resolve another fundamental problem: in 1978 China’s foreign 
exchange reserves were literally non-existent. This meant that the Chinese economy was 
unable to pay for the goods it wanted to import. This problem was rooted, as Naughton points 
out, in the ambitious and unrealistic plans to develop new sources of petroleum, which “was 
to have been the source of hard currency to pay for technology imports.”145  
However, as it turned out to the planners displeasure, neither the already explored 
fields contained as much oil as assumed, nor did the drillers find any suitable new sources. 
With the reorientation during the 3rd Plenum in December 1978, when it was already too 
obvious that the targets set in the Ten-Year-Plan (TYP) would never be able to be met, the 
government decided to increase grain imports. This was done in order to avoid a too fast 
increase in rural incomes now that higher prices had made it more attractive for farmers to 
increase production. The downside of this plan was that additional imports would put further 
pressure on foreign reserves.  
At the onset of the reforms, the government faced two problems: Frist, despite sending 
workers to the labor intensive industries, the government knew that it would take some time 
for the manufactories to produce any goods that could be used for generating new foreign 
reserves, which in turn could be used to purchase imports. Second, the only way to keep the 
entire process under control was to cut back investment for plant imports radically, which in 
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turn would delay the industrial development. Despite the reallocation of investment, China’s 
foreign reserves turned negative in 1980. 
Nevertheless, as Table 2 shows, China’s foreign exchange reserve grew steadily from 
a plus of 2.7 billion US dollars in 1981 to 165.6 billion at the end of 2000146, the year China 
was granted access to the WTO. This was made possible first, by the effects of the 
government’s reallocation of excess labor away from agriculture to the labor-intensive 
manufacturing industries where they were of more use. And second, farmers had more 
incentives to raise productivity and in combination with newer equipment, that this amount of 
labor was not needed anymore. Finally, the central government’s plan actually worked out 
and labor-intensive goods became an additional source of income and trade as a share of GDP 
grew from 13.6% to 29.1% between 1978 and 2000.147 Foreign reserves grew almost five-fold 
between 2000 and 2005 to 818 billion US dollars.148 Clearly China’s entrance to the WTO has 
had its impact. Until 2008, trade as share of GDP has increased to over 62%, down from 70% 
in 2006 and 68% in 2007.149 
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Table 2: Foreign Exchange Reserves 1978 – 2005150 
(in billion US dollars) 
 
End of Year Forex Reserves End of Year ForexReserves 
1978 0.167 1993 21.199 
1979 0.840 1994 51.620 
1980 -1.296 1995 73.597 
1981 2.708 1996 105.049 
1982 6.986 1997 139.890 
1983 8.901 1998 144.959 
1984 8.220 1999 154.675 
1985 2.644 2000 165.574 
1986 2.072 2001 212.165 
1988 3.372 2002 286.407 
1989 5.550 2003 403.251 
1990 11.093 2004 609.932 
1991 21.712 2005 818.872 
1992 19.443   
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China’s Accession to the WTO 
The Chinese leadership had realized that if it wanted continue the country’s economic 
growth and establish a socialist market economy, it would have to rejoin the international 
trade community. And in 1987 China formally requested a reconsideration of its status as a 
GATT contracting party.151 On 7 December 1995 the People’s Republic of China submitted 
its official application to change its status from a GATT contracting party to become a full 
member of the WTO. While the parties were confident that China would continue its progress, 
there were some concerns. The first was a very fundamental issue: What status should the 
working party give to China?  
On the one hand, China had a very low per capita income, which would have entitled 
it to assume the status of a developing nation. This, in turn, would mean that the terms Beijing 
would have to accept were less stringent. On the other hand, China’s rapid export growth 
showed that it has already reached a level where it could compete with others in some areas. 
In addition to that, many countries considered China become a serious competitor. As if that 
had not been enough, two events delayed China’s application process. One was the 
Tiananmen incident, after which China found itself isolated by the international community.  
The other was the fall of the Soviet Union two years later which suddenly created the 
possibility of all eastern European countries to join. Naturally, since members of the working 
party considered China to be model for these countries, China was not granted “developing 
country status.”152 Shengming, on the other side, argues in favor of the developing country 
status, pointing out that China’s population size is both a huge potential market and a burden 
for the economy and the international economy. If reforms are too demanding or implemented 
too quickly it may cause unrests and political instability. His second point is that despite 
China’s exorbitant growth, per capita income is still at the level of a developing country with 
a significant share of the population still living in poverty.153 
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In the end, China had to commit to more stringent adaptions than most other 
development countries. Following is a short summary of the major commitments that China 
guaranteed it would abide to. The first point members of the working party made was that 
China must implement a so called non-discrimination policy towards foreign individuals and 
companies.154 China was also asked to further reduce its tariff and nontariff barriers for both, 
goods and services to provide greater access to its market.  
Furthermore, Beijing was restricted to commit to not raising tariffs above the agreed 
(low) levels in the future and to “eliminate all quotas, licenses, tendering requirements, and 
other nontariff barriers to imports no later than 2005”.155 Of importance to the international 
community was also that China would further adjust its price system towards market 
determined prices. This was demanded as many nations feared that China’s dual track system 
could become a trade barrier at some point.156 And despite China merging the official Yuan 
rate with the market exchange rate on 1 January 1994157, some feared that like with prices 
China could make “use of forex controls to regulate the level and composition of trade in 
goods and services”158. In the end, the Chinese committed to all the major reforms requested 
by the international community. The elimination of the dual-price system, the implementation 
of WTO laws and regulation on both national and sub-national levels – with local authorities 
not having the power to overrule these laws – as well as the non-discrimination and non-
intervention policies by the Chinese government were implemented or expanded. 
Political Capabilities 
A country’s ability to reach its goals using its diplomatic tools is of great importance. 
After all, containing an opponent without having to fight him is first, a lot cheaper financially 
than fighting a bloody war. Second, the country that can do the job without using military 
force, does not risk losing people on the battle field and can put them at work in the factories 
at home. And third, achieving goals peacefully simply erases the option that might 
(unexpectedly) lose the battle like, for example, Soviet Russia did in Afghanistan. Despite the 
financial and subsequently military support from the United States, Afghan fighters were still 
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underequipped in the conflict. Nevertheless, they got what they wanted: a Russian retreat. 
Here, my point is not to challenge neorealist theory, but to show that a country also has the 
chance to minimize risks. For example, as much as it makes sense for companies to minimize 
financial risks, it makes sense for any country to make use of its capabilities at minimal risk 
and maximal efficiency. 
WTO Accession 
Despite China’s emergence, its (political) power limits became evident during the 
accession process to the WTO. Two things about China’s accession are striking. First, the 
majority of nations, led by the United States, already thought of China as a future threat and 
subsequently aimed to contain its growth of economic power by insisting on harsher criteria 
than they would have with other countries that wanted to join. A first step was to insist that 
China was not to be treated as a developing country but like a developed one due to its fast 
growing exports. Tariffs on imports had to be reduced to a far lower level than those of Brazil, 
India or Indonesia.159  
For example, China had to reduce average tariffs on industrial products to 8.9% until 
2005, while Argentina (30.9%), India (32.4%), Indonesia (36.9%), and Brazil (27%) were 
granted higher tariff rates.160 Second, U.S. policymakers insisted on a variety of additional 
points China would have to stick to. Unlike other countries, China’s commitments in the trade 
agreements would not be intentional, but binding. They also insisted that China abided to 
import and agreed minimum quantity of wheat and other (agricultural) products so that the 
Chinese government could not increase domestic prices which would have meant that Chinese 
farmers had an incentive to increase their production instead of buying from countries (mostly 
the U.S.) that sought to export to China.  
Hong Kong 
With the example of Hong Kong I would like to stress China’s growing political 
capabilities to solve delicate matters to her advantage, and, if possible, without military action. 
The peaceful handover of Hong Kong on July 1st 1997 added an important piece to the 
mainland which the Communist Party achieved through smart bargaining. When the British 
leased the New Territories in 1898 for 99 years, they never thought, under any circumstances, 
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that they would lose Hong Kong at any point in the future. Even after 1911, when the 
Republic of China announced that it “would not be bound by any “unequal” treaties signed 
by the Qing government” 161 , the British did not attempt to find a political solution for 
permanent settlement.162  
On the other side, the various Chinese governments knew that they were not strong 
enough militarily to reclaim Hong Kong. After World War II, when the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) had swept through the country in 1949, the Central Government, despite not 
acknowledging any previously signed contracts by any precursor state as well, assured the 
international community that the only solution to the matter would be a peaceful one. At the 
same time, it made clear to the world that it was nevertheless prepared to deal with each case 
separately as there was also the question of Macao to be resolved.  
By skillfully delaying talks, and due to British lack of interest (it seems) in extending 
the lease Chinese officials made it clear to British officials that there was no way that they 
could retain Hong Kong beyond 1 July 1997 in the late 1970s. Furthermore, the trade-offs the 
Chinese leadership had to accept - namely, that Hong Kong’s political structure would not be 
altered for 50 years upon accession and that the Special Administrative Region’s 
independence would be maintained legally for the same period as well163 - were some they 
were willing to accept in return for a fully developed economic zone that Hong Kong would 
be in1997. 
While the return of Hong Kong can be seen as a diplomatic success Chinas, we have 
to be careful putting too much meaning to it. Adding Hong Kong (and Macau) to its territories 
peacefully might indicate that China was indeed on the way up, while Britain’s power in the 
region was vanishing at the same time. However, we must not forget that in the second half of 
the twentieth century Britain was not a great power anymore and that its influence was 
declining globally. An example is the Falklands war in 1982, when Argentina challenged 
British ownership of the islands militarily. The British could fend Argentina off, but 15 years 
later there was no way it could have stopped China from taking over Hong Kong. 
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Chinese Views of the World Order164 
China has considered itself the center of the world ever since. The name 
“Zhongguo”(中国) dates back to the Zhou Dynasty (1046-256 BC) which considered itself to 
be the “center of the world”. Despite being used mostly in Western sources, Zhongguo 
became the official name for Chine as late as 1911.165 Closely related to this is the concept of 
“Tianxia” (天下) which stands for “under heaven”, meaning that (in ancient times) the 
Chinese (emperor with the “mandate of heaven”) would be the center of the world and 
everyone else was subordinate. The center was “China” and in the outermost circle would be 
the barbarians. 
To put in Callahans words, “Tianxia seeks to unify not only the world, but also the 
world of thought as well.”166 The problem with the universal concept, according to him, is 
that not everyone wants to be part of it and that those who do not want to become a “friend” 
will be branded a terrorist threat that calls for military intervention.167 The real issue in the 
near future will be that Tianxia is becoming more and more popular among the Chinese 
people, scholars, and policymakers alike and that the government includes this thinking more 
and more into its foreign policy. Consequently, since all nations have their own philosophy 
and since great powers can enforce them more aggressively, the threat of a clash of 
civilizations will inevitable become a reality if China continues its emergence. It is not only 
that the United States and China will have different goals and ideas. It is also that they have 
different definitions, for example of what is war and what is considered a “domestic issue”. 
Therefore, China’s actions in the South China Sea as well as in other places such as 
Tibet should be of no surprise from this angle. Also the West and especially the United States 
should be prepared to engage with China’s ever increasing self-confidence and therefore its 
unsaturated will to “befriend” its neighbors and repel everyone who does not conform with 
Tianxia. In a standoff with the United States, it seems to me that China will find it easier to 
argue that its interventions and military modernization are merely of defensive nature because 
not only China has a stake in balancing the U.S., but so do Russia, Iran, and maybe some 
European nations that want to loosen the grip the U.S. has laid on them.  
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This, however, is not likely to happen very soon as China’s military capabilities are 
still relatively limited compared to American. And despite Mearsheimer pointing out 
regularly that past behavior is not a reliable indicator to predict future actions as leaders 
change continuously 168, we can say one thing for sure: If China continues its economic 
emergence and manages to further improve its military capabilities it will most likely strive at 
least for regional hegemony. 
Military Capabilities (since 1990) 
Modernization 
China’s most important project to increase its armed forces operational range is to 
build up a new and technologically advanced blue water navy. So far the Chinese Navy still 
consists of many old ships and is undergoing modernization. The backbone of this new navy 
will be aircraft carriers that China developing. So far, however, China hast only one aircraft 
carrier which it bought from the Ukraine in 1998 and uses it for training purposes to prepare 
its forces for the new generation of 97,000 ton atomic powered carriers which are expected to 
be put in service by 2020 and supposed to equal U.S. carriers in fire force.169  
Furthermore, the PLA Navy has invested in a new class of nuclear-powered 
submarines, the Type 094, in order to be able to operate further away from the mainland. It is 
estimated that China will build at least six such submarines, which are all capable of carrying 
nuclear missiles, in the years to come. 170  The PLAN has also constantly upgraded its 
destroyers and frigates since the 1990s and will introduce new, more capable, ships in the near 
future. The Central Government also makes a serious effort to modernize its air force as well. 
Circe half of China’s fighter aircrafts were developed in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, all 
connected in some way to Soviet planes from the 1960s. Even a significant number of China’s 
new planes will either be Russian planes, such as the SU-30, or, if indigenously built, such as 
the Shenyang J-11, are based on a Russian model. Only the Chengdu J-10 was developed by 
the Chinese alone. Together with the J-11, this plan is supposed to become the new backbone 
of the air force.171 Furthermore, reports have surfaced that China is also developing a new 
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stealth fighter, the Chengdu J-20, which is supposed to match American counterparts.172 It 
seems that China’s intelligence has done a great job in keeping the rest of the world in the 
dark about this program for a long time. If it manages to get the J-20 ready for combat, which 
will most likely take some more years, the security situation not only for Taiwan, but also for 
the entire region changes significantly.173 
Operations 
In the past twenty years China’s military has undergone a significant transformation. 
Until the early 1990s the Chinese military was considered to be incapable to threaten anyone 
outside China and operations were limited to the coastal regions to defend the country. 
However, China’s economic rise has given the leadership in Beijing enough resources to 
modernize its military forces and extend the range of its operations. For example, China is 
building what Christopher Pehrson referred to as a “String of Pearls”174, which is series of 
strategic facilities from Woody Island off the coast of Viet Nam all the way to Pakistan175  
and the Persian Gulf.176 By establishing these potential military bases, China is trying to build 
up a security net to protect its trade routes.  
After all, in 2008 more than 80 % of China’s oil imports were transported through the 
Strait of Malacca 177 . In addition to protecting its own transports, China can also block 
supplies designated for other countries. In order to be able to do so one day, China increases 
its presence in the South China Sea because “Northeast Asia relies heavily on the flow of oil 
and commerce through South China Sea shipping lanes, including 80 percent of the crude oil 
to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.”178  
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In addition to controlling the world’s most important sea lanes, China is also interested 
in the South China Sea because of the huge amount natural resources that is believed to be 
stored underground and that can be exploited in the future. In the light of China’s every 
increasing energy demand these resources will become an important source of supply for 
China. Thus, if China manages to assume and maintain a powerful position in the region, it 
can put significant pressure on other states by blocking the shipping routes until it gets what it 
wants. China will also be able to observe (and contain) military maneuvers of other 
countries.179 
Assuming a powerful position in the South China Sea would therefore be of greatest 
importance to China. PLA deployment of forces along the coast opposite of Taiwan 
underlines China’s ambitions to not only be prepared to take military action against the 
island-state, but also to put out its hand to control the region. Considering my previous 
assessment about China’s views of the world, its military development and operations 
conducted actively and passively, namely sending its ships further away from the coast and 
building infrastructure that can be used for military purposes in foreign countries is in 
accordance with the Tianxia concept. Considering the mainland as the center, adding Taiwan 
and other territories such as Tibet, and gaining control over the South China Sea combined 
with making its influence felt by its neighbor countries is a first step to creating a world under 
China’s reign. 
Assessment Of China’s Position 
This section deals with the determination of China’s position in both, the world and 
the region. My analysis will span from 1989 to 2008 for two reasons. First, data availability is 
very limited for the time before 1990 and mostly rough estimates. Second, the paper focuses 
on the time after 1990. For my analysis I will use an approach similar to Kumar’s and other 
power circle theorists to assess the relative power of the involved nations. On the world level, 
I will compare China and the United States, and I will add Japan and Vietnam to derive the 
regional power ranking. The first assessment intends to find out whether China has already a 
global power position. Because if that was the case, China should not only have a similar 
score as the United States, but we should also find similar interdependence patterns between 
China and the United States as the ones between the U.S. and Soviet Russia. 
                                                 
179 Page, A Chinese Stealth Challenge 
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I have chosen to compare the four countries with each other in the regional assessment 
for three reasons. First, since Japan has become the regional hegemon soon after it took off in 
the 1950s it is important to know whether or not China has taken its spot as the leading Asian 
nation. Second, the United States, as the only super power left after the fall of the iron curtain, 
has sought to project its power to foreign territories ever since the Great White Fleet 
circumnavigated the world in 1907/8. The U.S. has also maintained a significant military 
presence in Asia since the end of World War II and values the region strategically even more 
today as President Obama has indicated in his “State of the Union” in January 2012.180 Third, 
I added Vietnam in order to determine its position in Asia as well.  
I will use the some indicators that Kumar181 used to assess the power-relations over 
the 19 years since 1989. But I will make significant alterations to his approach as I believe 
that other indicators are more useful in this case. Instead of GNP (absolute and per capita), I 
will use GDP (absolute and per capita) and replace energy consumption and energy 
consumption per capita with FDI (net inflows and net outflows) to my analysis. I have also 
added nuclear weapons as an indicator of power as they play an important role in a neorealist 
power assessment. Therefore, besides the indicators just mentioned, the list is completed by 
population, trade, military expenditure and military expenditure as a percentage of GDP. 
Like in Kumar’s analysis, the score for each country is calculated relative to the 
other(s). All indicators are weighted equally and their “overall relative power score…is 
calculated as an average of the relative shares of that country on the individual 
indicators.” 182 These indicators are important to make a direct statement about two of a 
country’s capabilities; this combination assesses a country’s economic strength and its 
military strength at the same time. What makes this theory useful to support a neorealist 
analysis is its quantifying approach. Therefore, despite being far from complete - for example, 
Power Cycle theory is not able to assess variables such as political stability or soft power183 – 
Kumar’s approach is still a good indicator to hint how powerful a country is, because a 
                                                 
180 The Guardian Online, State of the union 2012: full transcript of President Obama's speech. The full text of 
President Barack Obama's third state of the union address to Congress on 24 January 2012. Online: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/25/state-of-the-union-address-full-text  (accessed: 15.05.2012) 
181 Sushil Kumar, Power Cycle Analysis of India, China, and Pakistan in Regional and Global Policies. In: 
International Political Science Review Vol. 24, No. 1, Power Cycle Theory and Global Politics (January, 2003), 
pp.113-122 
182 Kumar, Power Cycle Analysis, p.115 
183 Joseph Nye, Why China is weak on soft power. In: New York Times online (18.01.2012). Online: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/opinion/why-china-is-weak-on-soft-power.html?_r=1 (accessed: 
24.04.2012) 
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military and economic strong nation is usually “politically strong” as well. In the following 
section I will first address each indicator individually before presenting the results. 
Population 
As Graph 1 below indicates, China has by far the largest population of all countries, 
account consistently for 71% of the combined population since 1989. In 1982 China’s 
population passed the 1 billion mark and in 1989 there lived around 1.1 billion people in 
China. 2008 the population was made up by roughly 1.3 billion people.184 Therefore, between 
1989 and 2008, China’s population has grown by some 200 million people, which is an 18.4% 
increase and equals Indonesia’s population in 2000.185 What are the implications of this for 
China? On the upside, China did add potential workers roughly equal to U.S.’s population 
in2008. These workers can be useful for example in the labor-intensive industries and help 
increasing China’s production. 
On the downside, a surge in population causes strains on resources such as land and 
water. It also means that gains from economic growth have to be shared by more people and 
cause living standards to be lower than they could have been. The United States, on the other 
side, has experienced a population growth of about 57 million, or 23.3%, during the same 
period.186 Japan, on the other side, has barely experienced population growth. Between 1989 
and 2008 the Japanese population only increased by 3.7%, or 4.5 million people.187 During 
the same period Vietnam’s population grew by some 20 million from 64 to 85 million 
people.188 
                                                 
184 World Bank Country Data, China 
185 Badan Pusat Statistic, Population of Indonesia by Province 1971, 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2010. Online: 
http://dds.bps.go.id/eng/tab_sub/view.php?tabel=1&daftar=1&id_subyek=12&notab=1 (accessed: 16.05.2012) 
186 World Bank Country Data, United States. Online: http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states (accessed: 
24.01.2012) 
187 World Bank Country Data, Japan. Online: http://data.worldbank.org/country/japan (accessed: 24.01.2012) 
188 World Bank Country Data, Vietnam. Online: http://data.worldbank.org/country/vietnam (accessed: 
24.01.2012) 
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Graph 1: Population, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2003, 2008189 
 
 
Trade 
Trade is China’s has been the main driver for its emergence. Since 1978 China has 
increasingly focused on trade as the main source of economic growth. But, while trade 
increased significantly during the Reform Era, China’s accession to the WTO gave it a real 
boost. In fact, all parties involved have benefitted quite remarkably from China’s accession to 
the WTO as well. Despite everyone being concerned about the American trade deficit with 
China, it has to be noted that China’s imports of goods from the United States have increased 
by 370% between the accession and 2008.190 
However, China’s exports of goods to the United States have increased by almost 
500%.191 Trade with Japan, for example, has experienced a different development. While 
imports from Japan increased 355% 192 , exports to Japan increased by 230% only until 
2008.193 However, the most impressive results came from trade with the world. Exports of 
goods to the world increased 613% while imports increased.194 The share of total trade of 
                                                 
189 World Bank Country Data, China; World Bank Country Data, Japan 
World Bank Country Data, United States; World Bank Country Data, Vietnam 
190 ITC Trade Statistics, Bilateral Trade. Online: http://www.trademap.org/tradestat/Bilateral_TS.aspx (accessed: 
22.01.2012) 
191 ITC Trade Statistics, Bilateral Trade 
192 ITC Trade Statistics, Bilateral Trade 
193 ITC Trade Statistics, Bilateral Trade 
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China’s GDP increased from 29% in 1989 to over 62% in 2008195 while the United States and 
Japan both have had lower shares in GDP than China. The value of trade for the first 
increased from 20% to 30% of GDP196, while it increased from 19% to 34% for the latter 
during the same period.197  
The implications are relatively clear. The relatively high share of trade means that 
China’s economy depends more on what’s going on in the world than the American or 
Japanese economy. At the same time, it shows that China’s domestic markets are relatively 
underdeveloped so far compared to the other two. With less purchasing power, the Chinese 
companies have only very little incentive to sell their goods at home, but rather seek to export 
their products. Another implication, which can be taken from Graph 2 below, is that trade 
generally has increased significantly. And even though Vietnam lags behind it made 
significant progress. But U.S. fears that China’s WTO accession has caused harm to the U.S. 
economy, do not seem to hold true as U.S. trade exploded just like China’s. Furthermore, it 
seems that Japan has also benefitted from China joining the WTO.  
 
 
Graph 2: Trade 1989 - 2008198 
 
 
                                                 
195 World Bank Country Data, China 
196 World Bank Country Data, United States 
197 World Bank Country Data, Japan 
198 World Bank Country Data, China; World Bank Country Data, Japan 
World Bank Country Data, United States; World Bank Country Data, Vietnam 
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GDP 
 Looking at GDP as an indicator of power, the situation is clear. In both categories, 
GDP and GDP per capita, the United States and Japan are the leading nations. While the U.S. 
has had the largest GDP throughout the period, Japan was the leading nation in GDP per 
capita due to its relatively small population size compared to the United States. Vietnam is in 
both categories last and shows only marginal signs of catching up. Table 3 shows that China 
and Vietnam have experienced a significant growth in GDP and GDP per capita. As China 
grew by 528% and 430%200 in the respective category, Vietnam’s GDP grew by 290%, and its 
GDP per capita by 197%201 between 1989 and 2008. 
 
On the other side, while Graph 3 clearly shows that even though China has 
continuously caught up with the United States and Japan in GDP, we cannot find the same 
results in the per capita comparison despite the fact that both, the U.S. and Japan grew 
relatively little in GDP and GDP per capita. U.S GDP grew by 68% and per capita GDP grew 
by 36%202, while Japan’s growth was even smaller with 30% for GDP and 25% for per capita 
income. 203 However, it has to be pointed out that both, the U.S. and Japan had already 
achieved high levels of GDP and GDP per capita and absolute gains are still higher than those 
for China. For example, while U.S. GDP per capita grew by almost 10,300 USD204, Japan’s 
by 8,200 USD205 while China’s per capita income grew only by 1649 USD206 between 1989 
and 2008. Vietnam could increase per capita GDP only by a meager 435 USD during that 
time.207 
                                                 
199 World Bank Country Data, China; World Bank Country Data, Japan; World Bank Country Data, United 
States; World Bank Country Data, Vietnam 
200 World Bank Country Data, China 
201 World Bank Country Data, Vietnam 
202 World Bank Country Data, United States 
203 World Bank Country Data, Japan 
204 World Bank Country Data, United States 
205 World Bank Country Data, Japan 
206 World Bank Country Data, China 
207 World Bank Country Data, Vietnam 
Table 3: GDP & GDP per capita growth (in %), 1989 – 2008199 
 USA China Japan Vietnam 
GDP 68.39% 528.62% 30.30% 290.97% 
GDP per capita 36.68% 430.86% 25.62% 197.51% 
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Graph 3: GDP 1989 - 2008208 
 
 
 
 
Graph 4: GDP per capita, 1989-2008209 
 
 
                                                 
208 World Bank Country Data, China; World Bank Country Data, Japan; World Bank Country Data, United 
States; World Bank Country Data, Vietnam 
209 World Bank Country Data, China; World Bank Country Data, Japan 
World Bank Country Data, United States; World Bank Country Data, Vietnam 
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With respect to China, we can see a clear upward movement in both categories, but 
have to realize that China’s population could not benefit from the economic gains. Comparing 
Japan and China, the data support my statement that Japans smaller population helps its 
people to gain more from economic growth than the Chinese can. However, what seems to 
matter to the Chinese government is the size of GDP and not the per capita value. The 
question about whether to assess a country’s economic strength in total values or in per capita 
values has been an issue for quite some time and I will address it later on. For now, it suffices 
to realize that China is growing faster than other countries and that it is therefore catching up. 
FDI 
FDI is an important indicator to assess two things. Frist, it helps to understand the 
attractiveness of a country, since steady (and rising) inflows of FDI are only guaranteed if the 
country is politically stable. Second, FDI gives us a hint about a country’s dependency on 
other and its ability to make others dependent. A country that invests heavily in another 
country for several years sooner or later owns a considerable share of the latter’s economy. 
This in turn means that the latter country depends more on the former and has to fear rapid 
disinvestment as this would mean a shortage in financial resources necessary to operate the 
economy. In my analysis I have used both, FDI net inflows and FDI net outflows, to assess 
the relative power position of the nations involved. FDI net inflows are the net values of non-
residents into a country made by foreigners. Net outflows are net investments of a country’s 
residents to other countries. If, for example, FDI net outflows were negative, it would mean 
that domestic residents are disinvesting more in foreign economies than they are investing 
during a given period. 
Graph 5 illustrates that, despite the shock in 2001, that caused FDI net inflows to drop 
from 320 billion US$ in 2000 to 60 billion US$ in 2003, the United States has maneuvered 
itself back on the way up and attracted over 250 billion US$ again in 2008.210 For China, the 
period of 1991 to 1993 has brought a significant increase in FDI net inflows. From then until 
2004 the level did not change significantly. In 2005, however, net inflows increased from 48 
billion US$ to 98 billion US$.211 This was also the year in which China’s and the U.S. FDI 
net inflows diverged only marginally. Japan, on the other side, could keep up with neither the 
U.S. nor China as it experienced a rollercoaster ride. During the 1990s FDI net inflows were 
                                                 
210 World Bank Country Data, United States 
211 World Bank Country Data, China 
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relatively low (mostly below 5 billion US$) with significant variations during the years.212 
This would continue after the turn of the century but on a higher level.  
For Japan, net inflows would evolve around 10 billion US$ and turn negative in 2006 
(-7.9 billion US$) before they skyrocketed again in 2007 and 2008 to around 25 billion 
US$.213 Vietnams net inflows of FDI increased from virtually zero in 1989 to 2.4 billion 
US$ in 1994.214 However, a level around 2 billion US$ could only be maintained until 1996 
and would not be reached again until 2006 when net inflows were 1.9 billion US$.215 In 2007 
FDI net inflows reached 4.9 billion US$ and in 2008 they reached 5.8 billion US$.216 
 
 
 
Graph 5: FDI net inflows, 1989 - 2008217 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
212 World Bank Country Data, Japan 
213 World Bank Country Data, Japan 
214 World Bank Country Data, Vietnam 
215 World Bank Country Data, Vietnam 
216 World Bank Country Data, Vietnam 
217 World Bank Country Data, China; World Bank Country Data, Japan; World Bank Country Data, United 
States; World Bank Country Data, Vietnam 
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Concerning FDI net outflows, which are illustrated in Graph 6 bellow, the United 
States were the most important to invest in other countries. Despite major setbacks in 
1999/2000 and 2004/2005, U.S. net outward FDI has reached a level that was only topped by 
Japan before 1992 and in 2005. U.S. net foreign FDI was around 55 billion US$ in 1989 and 
peaked in 2007 when it reached 345 billion US$.218 The only other country that achieved a 
significant increase in net foreign investment was Japan, which, after falling from 68 billion 
US$ to 13.7 billion US$ (1993), increased investments to 137 billion US$ in 2008.219  
FDI net outflows for China and Vietnam were significantly lower than those of Japan 
and especially the United States during the observed period. With respect to Vietnam, it has to 
be mentioned that there are no data available on FDI net outflows until 2005. Between 2005 
and 2008 Vietnam’s net outflow of FDI increased from 55 million US$ to 183 million US$.220 
FDI, again, is an indicator that shows a country’s attractiveness to foreign investors. Even 
though China has attracted significant net inflows between 2004 and 2008 relative to the other 
nations, it still lacks far behind the United States. Furthermore, outward investment from 
China to the world has also never reached a niveau that could challenge American levels. 
 
Graph 6: FDI net outflows, 1989 - 2008221 
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220 World Bank Country Data, Vietnam 
221 World Bank Country Data, China; World Bank Country Data, Japan; World Bank Country Data, United 
States; World Bank Country Data, Vietnam 
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Military expenditure 
The amount of military spending gives a hint of a country’s intentions. A high level of 
expenditure means that a nation has, or intends to develop, significant military capabilities. In 
percentage of GDP, the United States has spent twice the amount on its military forces than 
China in most years. Again, to assess Vietnam’s strength is difficult because there are no data 
available for the years to 1995 to 2002 which skews the picture a little bit. What is worth 
noting, however, is that Vietnams military expenditure as share of GDP has dropped rapidly 
and significantly between 1989/90 and 1993 from more than seven percent to below three 
percent. Japan has spent between 0.9 and one percent of GDP for its military forces 
throughout the years. Graph 7 shows the absolute military expenditure of all four countries.222 
As one can see, the United States has spent significantly more than any other country, and 
three to five times more than China, Japan, and Vietnam combined, which is illustrated in 
Graph 8 further below.  
 
Graph 7: Military Expenditure 1989 - 2008223 
 
 
 
                                                 
222 It has to be noted that military expenditure has been calculated with constant 2000 USD, which means that 
they might diverge significantly. For example, China’s military expenditure in 2008, measured in 2000 USD, 
amounts some 53 billion USD. However, calculated in 2010 USD, as the SIPRI did, her 2008 military 
expenditure amounts some 96 billion USD.  
223 World Bank Country Data, China; World Bank Country Data, Japan; World Bank Country Data, United 
States; World Bank Country Data, Vietnam 
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Graph 8: Military Expenditure USA vs. Rest, 1989-2008224 
 
 
In order to provide a better understanding about military expenditure of the other 
countries, I have plotted a third graph, Graph 9, illustrating military expenditure developments 
without the United States. What is striking is that China’s military expenditure has increased 
fivefold between 1989 and 2008, while military expenditure of the other countries has 
increased marginally. In2007, China overtook Japan, which spent 48 billion US dollars in that 
year, in military spending. However, China’s roughly 53 billion US$ spent in 2008 only 
account for one tenth of U.S. spending on military. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
224 World Bank Country Data, China; World Bank Country Data, Japan; World Bank Country Data, United 
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Graph 9: Military Expenditure without the USA, 1989-2008225 
 
 
We can only argue that large military spending means that a country upholds a 
military of significant size and equipment. And this holds true if we compare China and the 
United States. For example, while China has one carrier, the ex-Varyag which is not battle-
ready, the United States had twelve super-carriers stationed around the globe until 
decommissioning the USS Kitty Hawk in 2009. In addition, the U.S. employs a fleet of B-2 
and YF-117 stealth bombers which give it the possibility to carry out missions on a world 
wide scale. The United States also spend a significant amount of money on the nuclear arsenal. 
Contrary, China does not have such capabilities (yet). 
Nuclear forces 
When it comes to nuclear weapons, none of the other countries can keep up with the 
United States. Of our sample, only China does possess nuclear weapons as well. And both, the 
U.S. and China have reduced the nuclear arsenal significantly between 1989 and 2008. 
However, the only reason China could increase its relative share is that the U.S. has reduced 
the number of nuclear warheads more drastically that China, namely from over 22,000 in 
1989 to 5,200 in 2008.226 During this period China reduced its arsenal from 422 to 225.227 It 
                                                 
225 World Bank Country Data, China; World Bank Country Data, Japan; World Bank Country Data, United 
States; World Bank Country Data, Vietnam 
226 Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945–2010. In: Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists (2010, 66: 77), p.82 
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also has to be noted that there are between 3,500 and 4,500 nuclear warheads that are waiting 
for dismantling and are therefore not listed in the DoD’s stockpile.228 Graph 10 illustrates this 
development. 
 
Graph 10: Nuclear Weapons229 
 
 
 
China’s position in the world 
As noted at the beginning of the chapter, it is important to determine whether China 
has assumed a great power position in the world system. Again, it has to be pointed out that 
the indicators used in the analysis do not encompass all crucial variables, such as soft power, 
to fully assess relative power positions. Also, since data on Vietnam are partially inaccessible, 
its position will be lower than what it would have if all data had been available. With this 
limited data it is very unlikely that the trend-lines shown below are close to reality, but they 
give a good hint at how those “real” power lines might look like. Furthermore, this power 
analysis is a zero-sum analysis, as the emergence of one country means a loss of power to 
another because the highest score a country can achieve is 100 per cent, which means that the 
other country/ies have 0. 
                                                                                                                                                        
227 Kristensen, Norris, Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, p.82 
228 Kristensen, Norris, Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, p.82 
229 Kristensen, Norris, Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories,  p.82 
0 
5000 
10000 
15000 
20000 
25000 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
USA 
China 
 67 
 
Even though the Graph 11 shows that China has not assumed a powerful position in 
the world and that it is in no way threating U.S. hegemony, we can still see that the gap 
between the two states has narrowed. The U.S.’s power score decreased from 84.5% to 75.4% 
during the observation period. Conversely, China’s score has increased from 15.5% to 24.6% 
during the period. So far, the United States still are the only super power in the world system. 
Nevertheless, despite developing its capabilities significantly, China still lags behind the 
United States. Differences in military spending and GDP (absolute and per capita), FDI and 
nuclear weapons cause the gap between the two countries.  
Again, it has to be noted that China lags behind in the GDP per capita section because 
of its population size. According to Kissane, if China manages to continue its growth, it will 
challenge the U.S. position sometime between 2015 and 2030.230 But, it has to be said that 
Kissane uses different indicators than I did. Using my data, keeping in mind that these are 
based on constant 2000 USD, and assuming that China will resume increasing its power 
continuously by 2.7% (which is the average percentage growth from 1989 to 2008), it will not 
overtake the United States until 2035 when it will score 51.8%.  
 
Graph 11: Power Relations World 
 
 
                                                 
230 Dylan Kissane, 2015 and the Rise of China: Power Cycle Analysis and the Implications for Australia. In: 
Security Challenges, Vol.1, No.1 (November, 2005), pp. 105-121, p.117 
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China’s Position in Southeast Asia 
As can be seen in Graph12, power relations show a different picture in Asia. The 
United States are the leading nation in Asia and China has managed to win ground against the 
United States, and also take over Japan as the new “domestic power”. The U.S. had to forfeit 
only a small amount power, as its score dropped from 58.1% in 1989 to 49.7% in 2005 and 
finally to 54.4% in 2008. While Japan achieved a higher score between 1989 and 1993 than 
China, the race for the number two spot in the region was a close one until 2001. While Japan 
scored 19.8% in 1989, China had a score of 11.5% in that year. In 2008 Japan’s score was 
16.1% while China’s was 18.8%. Vietnam never played a significant role at any point. Its 
power score is only of little value at best, as data unavailability of FDI net outflows (1989-
2004), military expenditure and military expenditure as share of GDP (both 1995-2002) 
distort the results significantly. 
 
 
Graph 12: Power Relations Asia 
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ISSUES 
No matter how compelling the analysis one tries to perform, there will always be some 
concern about certain issues. First of all, as I have mentioned numerous times above, a merely 
quantitative analysis will suffice in order to assess any country’s strength correctly. A 
quantitative approach is simply the most convenient way to make a statement as, for example, 
a higher rate of economic growth over a prolonged time is better than only little growth. But 
this approach can in no way tell us anything about quality. China might have the largest 
number of active military personnel, but this tells us nothing about their training and prowess 
to perform their tasks. Also, data provided to the world might look impressive, but in China’s 
case, we do not really know whether they are accurate or not. I will now focus the, in my 
opinion, most important matters that cause distress when analyzing China. 
Is China’s economy really that strong? 
GDP or GDP per capita 
One of the major discussions is how to asses economic strength. While China insists 
on using GDP as the determinant of economic might, which would make the country the 
second largest economy behind the United States, others insist that it makes more sense to 
look at GDP per capita. For example, according to the Economist, America’s GDP growth 
rate gets flattened by immigration and relatively high birth rates. Contrary, Japan, even 
though its population has never grown more than 1% since 1975 and not more than 0.5% 
since 1986, has achieved a lower GDP growth than the United States. 
However, Japan’s population has benefitted more from the relatively smaller growth 
than Americans because while the pie got bigger, fewer mouths had to be fed.231 China’s 
position in this dispute makes sense. After all, every country aims for a more powerful 
position. Then again, given its sheer infinite labor supply, one could argue that a nation of 
China’s size has to produce more than the United States. I am sure that even India will, at 
some point, outperform the American economy. And it might produce even more than China 
one day. Even though GDP does not measure a country’s living standards it still helps to see 
trends of economic activity. Therefore, a high GDP per capita would suggest that, on average, 
people are not only better off, but also more productive. 
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China and the technology ladder 
Accusations of politicians, business leaders, and news corporations that China’s 
economic rise is threatening especially the U.S. economy are not new. Aasche has pointed out 
that combined with the fear that China is climbing up the technology ladder – after all it is 
allegedly developing a stealth fighter, aircraft carriers and other goods of relatively high 
technological standards – pessimists identify two threats: A quantitative threat associated with 
China’s stellar export performance, and a qualitative threat that is concerned with the 
increasing sophistication of China’s exports.232 
However, despite China’s soaring exports, there is evidence that at least the qualitative 
threat is rather illusion than reality. For example, Greg Linden has shown that the value added 
by the Chinese economy to the iPod is very small. He calculated that while the trade balance 
between the United States and China shifts for about 150USD in favor of China for every 
iPod exported to the U.S.. However, none of the important parts, such as the CPU, are 
manufactured by a Chinese company. The work performed by a Chinese company to add 
value to the product accounts for “a few dollars at most”.233 My point with this example is 
this: Despite China’s massive export volume –Chinese companies assemble more than just the 
iPod and it would not be difficult to find other examples – it is not capable of producing high-
quality products on its own.  
If we look at great powers throughout the history, we find that each was a 
technologically leading nation, not only militarily, but also economically. For example, Great 
Britain economic strength was built on a technological advantage that triggered the Industrial 
Revolution and made Great Britain the great power of the 19th century. The United States 
became a great power during the 20th century because it became the economically leading 
country. This means that, unless China manages to produce its own high-technology products, 
it will depend more on other economies than the other way around. 
In the end, if American and other foreign companies find the environment too 
adversely to conduct business they could also go somewhere else for several reasons. The first 
reason to relocate their business are rising wages of Chinese workers. For example, Wal-Mart 
is putting more and more pressure on their Chinese suppliers who have to cut positions 
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because higher wages are eating up profits.234 The second is increasing shipping costs mostly 
because of higher oil prices and transportation costs. For example, “GE is moving production 
of its hybrid water heaters to Kentucky, saying rising Chinese labour costs and shipping costs 
make it more competitive to produce locally for the US market” others such as Vodafone are 
leaving China entirely.235  
Data are inaccurate 
Military budget and growth figures 
However, everyone dealing with data should question their genuineness. This is 
particularly true with China as the government is very reluctant to have any outsider get an 
insight. In my opinion the problem with official data is that the Chinese government bends 
them the way it wants. One example would be the understatement of military expenditure. 
Despite the increasing availability on military data, the government is not only still reluctant 
to publish details of the military budget, but it is considered to understate expenditure figures 
significantly.236 It is therefore hard, if not impossible, to draw any sound conclusions about 
China’s military development. Another example would be the overstated growth (provincial) 
party officials are incentivized to report.  
Provincial officials, for example, are therefore inclined to overstate their production 
figures as it strengthens their position within the party. On the international level it is good for 
China to overstate its growth figures for two reasons. First, it looks economically stronger. 
And second, higher growth figures lure more foreign investment into the country further 
accelerating China’s rise. Nevertheless, there seems to be more and more doubt 
internationally about Chinese publications of data. The U.S. Department of Defense reckons 
with China regularly understating its military expenditure.237 
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FDI 
The third issue that I will raise concerning data coming from China deals with FDI. 
The Central Government, again, uses data inaccurately to its advantage and counts investment 
from Hong Kong towards FDI. Despite Hong Kong being (legally) an independent entity, it 
has to be said that the Chinese approach is only to polish its investment data. Even though its 
share in FDI has dropped from 60% in 1989 to 37.9% in 2008, Hong Kong is still the single 
largest FDI source for China followed by the European Union, which accounted for 4.6% of 
FDI in 2008.238 To explain the reason for this is simple. Many Chinese businesses establish a 
shell company in Hong Kong that invests in China in order to take advantage of tax incentives 
and other advantages. When these benefits end after some years, the main company simply 
shuts down its Hong Kong-based subsidiary and establishes a new one again. 
SUMMARY 
In this chapter I have tried to show that China has transformed its capabilities 
significantly since 1949. There are several findings that are of interest. First, the emergence of 
a nation takes place only over time. Like the United States, China is rising gradually in a 
relatively safe environment. While the United States deduced its security from her geographic 
isolation, China was simply seen economically and militarily too weak to pose a threat to 
stronger nations in the past. Second, the rise of reformist leaders to power started a journey 
that would transform the country’s economic environment from one characterized by trial and 
error towards one that had features similar to a market economy. 
Despite liberals arguing that the leadership in charge as well as political institutions 
matter, they have missed that the new group of leaders did nothing else but act like neorealist 
theory would predict. Chinese leaders knew they would have to act in a self-help manner 
towards other nations if they wanted to secure their power position at home and lead China to 
become a powerful nation. China’s self-help has many facets. For example, in order to protect 
its economy, the government imposed significant trade barriers to keep foreigners out of the 
market. And despite being forced to lower many barriers and abandon policies that were seen 
as counterproductive to trade, when China accessed the WTO, the government still keeps up 
barriers. For example, ownership is still regulated and very limited for foreigners. Restricting 
foreign ownership is not only a tool to control the flow of capital in and out of the country, 
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but also to keep foreigners out of China and hence, Chinese companies under Chinese 
control.239 
Third, by attracting investment and opening up for trade, the government achieved 
three things. First, it could resolve the unemployment problem at home. Moving millions of 
workers to the newly established labor-intensive manufacturing industries helped to ease 
conflict potential among the population. Second, by attracting trade, China’s foreign reserves 
skyrocketed in the past 20 years which gives the government pretty good bargaining chips and 
helps to create an environment that makes other countries more dependent. Third, foreign 
companies coming to China does not only create jobs. It is also a way to learn and attain 
intellectual properties at a relatively low cost. In the recent past, Chinese companies have 
increasingly produced goods from cars to military jets that looked like their Western 
counterparts. However, most Chinese enterprises have, so far, not managed to create goods, 
such as cars, that equaled their Western counterparts in quality. 240  
Forth, China’s emergence since 1990 has had a significant impact on the alignment of 
states. While China was still too weak to challenge stronger nations right away during the 
WTO accession talks, which meant that it had to accept the demands teeth-gnashingly, it has 
started to take on a stronger position towards other countries and starts to make demands. For 
example, even though China is not capable to challenge the U.S. militarily so far, the U.S. 
deployment of troops to in military exercises, like the Balikatan exercise in the Philippines or 
the Cobra Gold exercise in Thailand every year,241 causes political distress between China 
and the United States.  
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Also, since Chinese officials are aware that the United States has taken advantage of 
China’s Open Door policy242, they seek to limit American influence not only in the Pacific 
region, but also in political matters, such as the human rights question, where Beijing does not 
tolerate international criticism any longer and literally tells other nations, including the United 
States, to mind their own business.243 This is because China perceives the United States to be 
a declining power, while China itself is emerging. In addition to the continuous warnings 
towards the United States to stay out of the region, China’s disputes in the South China Sea 
with Viet Nam, the Philippines, and partially Malaysia and Brunei show an increased 
confidence in its own capabilities. For example, despite having bilateral agreements with the 
involved nations about how to resolve the issue, China keeps ignoring them and bends the 
rules of conduct the way it pleases.244  
In the end, it has to be admitted that China is definitely on the rise and according to 
my analysis above, China has become Asia’s most powerful country. However, it is still far 
away from being a super-power and American influence in the region is still overwhelming. 
There is also evidence that other Asian countries start to counterbalance China and increase 
their cooperation with the United States (again). And it seems that in Asia, and possibly in the 
world as well, countries will have to ask themselves who to side with in the future, the U.S. or 
China. From an American point of view, China will most likely challenge the American 
presence in the region openly sooner than later. But this will not happen until China has 
developed a new generation of weapon systems and tactics and developed its domestic market 
in order to decrease its dependency on foreign buyers. 
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Chapter 3 – China and Southeast Asia 
I have defined China’s position in the world and the region in the last chapter. 
Furthermore, the data analysis on which I based my assessment showed that it still has not 
assumed a super-power position similar to the United States. Data rather indicate that it did 
overtake Japan as the leading nation in East Asia. But, despite China’s rise, American 
influence is still too strong in the region. Thus, referring to China as a regional hegemon 
would be wrong. China’s development causes significant alterations of economic patterns and 
power relations among nations worldwide and East Asia in particular. For example, supply 
chains have undergone a significant transformation during the past 30 years. While the 
production of only a limited number of goods was based on global supply and value chains in 
the 1970s and 1980s, production of most goods, such as the iPod, is spread globally.  
Furthermore, worldwide capital flows, for example, have shifted significantly as East 
Asian and other emerging nations such as Brazil, India, and South Africa are attracting more 
and more capital away from the established markets in order to further spur their economic 
growth. Parallel to the transformation of the world economy, power relations in the world 
have been tested as well since the end of World War II. Especially the fall of Soviet Russia 
and the opening up of China have triggered significant alterations and challenges for the 
established power ranking. 
As Jarvis and Welch point out, China’s connections with ASEAN (countries) have 
several reasons. Not only do the economic commitments in the form infrastructure 
investments and trade agreements with ASEAN nation help to build relations, but also do they 
support Beijing to enforce its strategic interests. Binding neighboring countries through 
economic cooperation is one way, but whenever it seems to the Sino government that her 
interests are not met, cooperation becomes competition.245 For example, in China has granted 
the Philippines several loans intended for infrastructure projects throughout the country (most 
notably to fund the expansion of the North Luzon Railway with an investment of 
approximately 400 million USD246). Furthermore, construction is mostly done by Chinese 
state-owned corporations. In return, China expects the Philippines to accept its demands not 
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only, for example, in the South China Sea and is prepared to take military action should the 
occasion arise. This way China does not only create dependency, but also makes sure that the 
money returns home.  
China’s actions in the region are also intended to contain Japan with which diplomatic 
relations are bad at best. For example, Chinese leaders do not want to forgive the Japanese for 
their actions during World War II. At the same time, Japanese leaders refuse to apologize for 
what had happened. Another issue of conflict is the struggle for the Senkaku Islands in the 
East China Sea which are important “for drawing lines for deep-sea gas and fishing rights”247 
These developments are, in my opinion, in accordance with my and neorealist analysis as 
public condemn of Japan clearly stands for China’s increasingly strong position relative to 
Japan. Contrary, a weaker state that has to fear its opponent does not, if its leaders are not 
insane, use aggressive language as it is increasingly the case with China. 
The People’s Republic became stronger in absolute and in relative terms since 1990. 
And China did not only expand its economic capabilities significantly. It also did develop its 
military forces massively to project its new power further away from its shores and, if need be, 
to enforce its (political) will with force. Thus, it behaves accordingly to neorealist theory in 
the region: the stronger nation makes the weaker nation dependent and challenges those 
whom it considers a threat. 
China’s new rank in the system and the implications for ASEAN and Vietnam in 
particular are the center of attention. I will investigate how China’s emergence has influenced 
ASEAN’s and Vietnam’s capabilities between 1990 and 2008 and how each reacted to the 
new power. Like in my analysis in the previous chapter, I will proceed from the “macro to the 
micro level”. This means that I will first elaborate on China’s relation with the ASEAN and 
then go on and look at China’s interconnection with Vietnam.  
It is important to elaborate on China-ASEAN relations as well not only because 
Vietnam is a member. It is also important to do so because each actor (China, ASEAN and 
Vietnam) uses a different approach for different issues. Sometimes Vietnam engages China as 
part of the ASEAN, and sometimes engagement takes place bilaterally. During this chapter I 
want to show how ASEAN and Vietnam attempt to balance China’s emergence. Also, this 
chapter tries to identify whether the assessment concerning China’s position holds true. Again, 
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I would like to stress that sound statistics are not available for Vietnam for the years before 
1995. Consequently, any attempt to support findings quantitatively for this period is 
unfortunately relatively inaccurate. 
China and ASEAN 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded in 1967 with the 
signing of the Bangkok declaration by Thailand, Malaysia, The Philippines, Indonesia and 
Singapore. Until 1999, five other nations, namely Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), Laos, 
Myanmar (bot 1997) and Cambodia (1999) joined ASEAN. Ever since its foundation, the 
main purpose of the ASEAN was to create peace, economic growth and stability in the 
region.248 This was to be achieved mainly by promoting trade and mutual respect “for the 
independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all 
nations”249 among the members. As Lim points out, creating peace and stability in a region 
“divided by conflict and war”250 was not the only reason why these nations got together. The 
other reason was China which, at that time, sought to spread communism to Southeast Asian 
countries.251 
While the ASEAN nations collaborate on other issues than economic cooperation as 
well, and the most striking feature of the ASEAN is the non-interference rule. It states that 
ASEAN members must not interfere with internal affairs of any other member-state. 252 
Acharya argues that the implementation should be of no surprise as each state was primarily 
concerned with its internal security, rather than with an external threat. Similar to Lim, he 
stresses that weak state structures and the internal threat were the driving factors behind its 
enforcement.253 Acharya further states that “ASEAN’s doctrine of non-interference was … an 
expression of a collective commitment of the survival of its non-communist regimes against 
the threat of communist subversion.”254  
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This, in my opinion, is another example for realist behavior-pattern of states. A 
common threat, in this case survival of the state, resulted in cooperation among nations. The 
gains each could attain through this pact were the same for all states. If gains among the 
participating nations had been distributed unequally, the difference between them must have 
been perceived as marginally small by each country. Thus, each could focus on solving its 
domestic problems without having to fear that another nation might take advantage of the 
situation.  
Besides that, ASEAN members have increased their cooperation in foreign relations 
over the years as well. Beginning in 1977, ASEAN members agreed to “expand the member 
states’ bilateral connections with important economic and strategic partners to a collective 
forum”255. The first nations to being named “dialogue partner” were New Zealand, Australia 
and Japan (all 1977). In 1978, Canada, the United States, and the European Community were 
announced dialogue partners. Later in 1991, South Korea, and in 1996, China, India and 
Russia were awarded this status. The ASEAN members meet after every annual ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting (AMM) first with all 10 partners as a group (ASEAN +10) and then with 
each country alone (ASEAN+1) to discuss pressing matters.256 
With the communist threat gone after 1989, the ASEAN transformed even further 
towards an economic cooperation. While there have been previous trade agreements such as 
the ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA) from 1977, which give priority to 
certain goods up to a certain value limit, or the ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIP) from 1976, 
which was created to foster industrial projects through multinational cooperation, the most 
important initiative was the creation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992. The 
goal was to reduce and subsequently eliminate all tariffs while increasing trade among the 
signatories even further within a 15 year timeframe. Lim identifies the transformation of the 
development strategy – from inward-oriented towards outward-oriented development – of 
most states as the key factor to AFTA’s success.257 Furthermore, the Initiative for ASEAN 
Integration (IAI) was initiated in 2000 in order to help new members to integrate themselves 
faster into the association’s economic and political system.  
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Trade 
Trade between the ASEAN region and China contributed relatively little to total 
ASEAN trade until 2003. Between 1995 and 2003 the volume of trade grew from 1.3 billion 
to 59.6 billion USD.258 The trade volume between the two accounted for a mere 2.1% of total 
trade in 1995, while Japan, as ASEAN’s single largest trading partner, held a share of 19.7%, 
followed by the United States (16.5%) and the EU-25 (14.7%).259 Until 2003, China’s share 
in ASEAN trade increased to 7.2% while the U.S. (14.3%), Japan (13.7%) and the EU-25 
(12.3%) continued to be the most important trading partners.260 While China’s overall trading 
performance between 2003 and 2008 is impressive (trade increased by 89%) 261 , the 
development of trade with the ASEAN region is even more astounding since it grew 222.8% 
during the same period.262 Subsequently, China became the region’s third most important 
trading partner in 2008.263  
However, throughout the period, the most important trading partner of ASEAN 
nations where other ASEAN members. While, for example, Japan’s trade with the ASEAN 
region in 1995 was only marginally smaller than inter-ASEAN trade, its trade volume 
decreased to 46.3% of inter-ASEAN trade in 2008.264 In addition, trade between ASEAN 
nations as a share of total trade has increased from 20% to 26% as total trade increased by 
177.9%.265 Subsequently, the ratio between extra- and intra-ASEAN as share of total trade 
has narrowed from 3.9 to 2.73 in favor of external trade. 266  Plus, the ASEAN have 
transformed from a net import region to a net export region having listed a surplus of about 48 
billion USD in 2008 – at the same time, the trade deficit with China grew from 928.8 million 
USD to 21.4 billion USD between 1995 and 2008267 
As I have stated previously, importing a significant share of goods from a single 
country makes the importing country dependent on the other. I also showed that China’s trade 
surged particularly after the turn of the century. Between 1995 and 2008 China moved up 
from the seventh to the second most important exporter to the ASEAN with the volume of 
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having grown fifteen-fold.268 At the same time, China as an export market has also become 
very attractive among ASEAN nations. While it was the sixth most important country that 
imported from ASEAN countries, China moved up to number four. Even though this might 
not sound impressive, it has to be noted that exports to China have increased 13.8-fold.269 At 
the same time, the United States slid to the fourth largest trading partner of the ASEAN 
region.270 The United States moved from the most important export destination down to the 
third most important and while the U.S. was the number two source of imports in 1995, it was 
only ranked fourth in 2008.271 Japan, on the other side, has been the most important import 
market for ASEAN economies. Furthermore, the country has become the second most 
important exports destination over the years.272 Subsequently, interdependence patterns also 
shifted significantly between 1990 and 2008. Trade has tied ASEAN nations closer together, 
which is in accordance with the Association’s goals. However, Sino-ASEAN trade 
developments indicate that the ASEAN economies became more dependent on China during 
that period than before. 
Cooperation 
While China was considered a Communist threat in the 1960s and 1970 that sought to 
spread its influence and ideology by force throughout Southeast Asia, cooperation between 
the ASEAN and the People’s Republic was enhanced ever since China’s Foreign Minister 
Qian Qichen attended the opening ceremony of the ASEAN ministerial meeting in Kuala 
Lumpur in 1991 and expressed his government’s keen interest to work closely together with 
ASEAN for mutual benefit.273 As a result – and as already mentioned above – China was 
granted the status of Dialogue Partner in 1996. In 2003 a Joint Declaration between the two 
parties was signed in Bali and a Plan of Action “to broaden and deepen ASEAN-China 
dialogue relations in a comprehensive and mutually beneficial manner while strengthening 
the strategic partnership for regional peace, development and prosperity” 274  was 
implemented a year later. 
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As I showed previously, some ASEAN nations disregard China’s demands of keeping 
outside powers outside and regularly conduct military exercises with the United States (e.g. 
Cobra Gold). What is a blow to China’s face is the fact that the military exercise that China 
should seek to host in order to impose its “defense strategy” upon the region is held by India. 
The “Milan” exercise is a multi-nation exercise hosted biannually since 1995. Its first 
participants included India, Indonesia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. In 2006 the 
number of participants had grown to 9275, and in 2008 to 14 nations, including “Australia, 
Bangladesh, Brunei, Philippines, Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Singapore, 
Vietnam, Malaysia, Maldives, Seychelles and Mauritius.”276 
South China Sea 
The biggest dispute between China and ASEAN members takes place in the South 
China Sea. While this conflict is not new, but rather reemerged after World War II, it plays 
the most important role in security consideration of (South) East Asian countries particularly 
since 1970. Tensions have never been as high as they were since the turn to the 20th century as 
the sea became very important to China in the 1990s when the country’s dependency on oil 
and other raw materials skyrocketed parallel to its economic output. 
The Sea is important to all nations for three reasons as well. First, the South China is 
one of the busiest, if not the busiest, sea transportation area in the world. Controlling these 
lanes would give any country a strategic advantage as it controls the flow of goods such as oil. 
In the case of China, controlling these sea lanes would mean to ensure its supply (most 
importantly oil and other natural resources) by military force if it had to. Second, the South 
China Sea is believed to be rich of natural resources. However, estimates diverge significantly 
across nations and Chinese assessments are (naturally) higher than those of Western 
analysts.277 The third reason of interest is that the South China Sea has become an important 
source for the fishing industry for countries like the Philippines where fish is the major dish of 
the people-278  
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China’s approach towards ASEAN is bilateral. Its position is that the single states have 
a say in the disputes and not the ASEAN as a whole. ASEAN members, on the other side, 
argue that China is trying to separate the nations as each country alone is weaker in order to 
play them against each other.279 China’s view that ASEAN has no saying in this is reflected in 
its adherence of the Declaration of Conduct (DoC) in 2002 in order to  
“resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without 
resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and 
negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance with 
universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.”280  
The only problem with the DoC is that China does not abide to its commitments and 
continuously threatens and contains other countries by sending warships to the region.281 
Subsequently, the sought military cooperation among ASEAN nations and between ASEAN 
nations and foreign powers such as India and the United States should be of no surprise to 
China (and the world) as ASEAN members clearly are in a process of balancing China’s 
emergence. 
China and Vietnam 
Vietnam is the weakest among the states in the sample that I have tested in the 
previous chapter. Despite the fact, as shown in Table 4, that Vietnam’s GDP per capita had 
almost tripled between 1990 and 2008 from 227 to roughly 656 USD282, this development still 
lags behind significantly to China’s. During this period, China had increased five-fold from 
383 USD to over 2030 USD per capita.283 This means that while Vietnam’s per capita income 
grew by 188.5%, China’s income grew by over 410% during the same period.284 Furthermore, 
Vietnam’s average GDP growth between 1990 and 2008 was between 7% and 8% on average, 
which is significantly lower than China’s average GDP growth. This resulted in Vietnam’s 
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GDP to grow by 290% compared to China’s 528%.285 Similarly, Vietnam’s trade grew by 
55%, China’s trade grew by more than 75% between 1990 and 2008.286 
 
From the data that I have provided in the paragraph above, it is obvious that China’s 
economy outperformed Vietnam’s., thus widening the gap between the two countries even 
further. Vietnam’s per capita GDP, for example, was 227USD in 1990, while Chinese per 
capita income was 382USD.288 In 2008 Vietnam’s value was 656 USD, but China’s was 
2032USD. 289  Therefore, the difference between people’s incomes in both countries 
subsequently increased from 155USD to 1376USD despite the fact that China’s population 
was 15 times the size of Vietnam’s. 
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Table 4: Cumulative Economic Data Vietnam, 1990-2008287 
 Population GDP growth (average) 
GDP per 
capita 
(constant 
2000USD) 
GDP per 
capita 
growth 
(in %) 
Trade 
growth 
(in %) 
1990-1994 
66016700 
(1990) 
7.32% 
227.48 
(1990) 
5.42% 29.01% 
1995-1999 
71995500 
(1995) 
7.51% 
309.41 
(1995) 
5.84% 80.26% 
2000-2004 
77630900 
(2000) 
7.17% 
401,56 
(2000) 
5.87% 63.62% 
2005-2008 
82393500 
(2005) 
7.86% 
543,35 
(2005) 
6.67% 49.37% 
 
85122300 
(2008) 
 
656,31 
(2008) 
  
Growth 
(1990 -2008) 
28,94%  188.5%  55.56% 
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Trade connections between China and Vietnam are, from a Chinese perspective, very 
limited. Vietnam has been a relatively unimportant trading partner for China since the 1990s. 
According to Chinese statistics, trade between the two countries had a total value of only 53.3 
million USD in 1994.290 In the following years, trade relations intensified significantly in 
subsequent years and the value of trade increased twelve-fold to 1.15 billion USD until 
1996.291 Until 2000, however, trade growth slowed down a little and reached a volume of 1.54 
billion USD.292 This is partly owed to the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/1998 which slowed 
down economic activity throughout the entire region. Since then and until 2008, Sino – 
Vietnamese trade relations experienced another surge, when overall trade between the two 
countries continuously grew to 19.46 billion USD.293 
These developments point out three important things in Vietnam’s trade relations with 
China. First, until 2008 China always ran a trade surplus versus Vietnam. Thus, Beijing sold 
more of its goods in Vietnam that the other way around. For example, trade with China grew 
twice as fast as Vietnam’s total trade between 1994 and 2008. While Vietnam’s total trade 
surged by 672%, trade with the People’s Republic exploded by more than 3,550% during the 
same period.294 Thus, it should be of no surprise that China’s share in Vietnam’s total trade 
increased from 3.8% to 20.4% during this period. 295 However, compared to China’s two 
largest trading partners in that year, Japan and the United States, trade with Vietnam seems 
only marginally important to China. Vietnam’s share of total Chinese trade increased only 
from 0.18% to 1.16% between 1994 and 2008, which is an increase of 542%.296  
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Despite the fact that China’s trade increased by a lesser 531.6%297 in the same period, 
it has to be understood that Vietnam has not become an important trading partner for the 
Chinese government a China’s politicians managed to increase Vietnam’s dependency. For 
example, if both sides stopped trading with each other today, the Chinese economy would 
probably not even notice the missing market. On the other side, if Vietnam could not do 
business with China anymore, its trade would be reduced by around 20% overnight. Therefore, 
Vietnam’s economic dependency was significantly increased during the 1990s and the first 
decade of the 21.century which gives the government in Beijing a significant advantage in 
political considerations. 
Balancing China? 
Vietnam’s opening up to ASEAN nations and the rest of the world has been a very 
long and stressful way for Vietnamese policy makers. With the fall of Soviet Russia, Hanoi’s 
most important ally had vanished overnight and the country was left with its biggest threats 
right across the borderlines. The first was the imperialist and capitalistic United States, which 
had to be balanced by Vietnam, at any cost, for ideological reasons. The second was China, 
with which political relations were in great need of improvement. The third problem 
Vietnamese leaders saw were the capitalist nations in Southeast Asia that threatened to isolate 
the country further by accelerating their economic development while Vietnam remained a 
backward country. 
The rationale behind approaching China immediately after the fall of the Iron Curtain 
was that government officials feared a possible Chinese attack and ideological similarities 
between both countries made this move seem reasonable for the Vietnamese government. 
Vietnamese leaders had to figure out a way to ensure the country’s security in the long run as 
the government also realized that external security would be the requirement to ensure 
internal security and stability. 
The first goal was to normalize relations with its northern neighbor, which was 
considered a paramount task considering that both countries fought a fierce war in 1979 and 
had further territorial disputes about islands in 1974 and 1988. Subsequently, Vietnam leaders 
chose was to defer to China when party and government chiefs did not celebrate Vietnam’s 
45th anniversary, but attended meetings with Chinese leaders. These included Vietnam’s 
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Pham van Dong, the country’s oldest statesman, but not Deng Xiaoping. During this meeting 
(and during the following decade) Vietnamese leaders tried to convince China to identify 
itself with Vietnam’s case and protect socialism on an ideological basis.298  
The lifting of the American embargo was very important for the country as it not only 
supported the Vietnamese economy - trade grew 29% between 1990 and 1994, but 72% 
between 1994 and 1998 299 – but also helped Vietnam out of isolation. Shortly after that 
Vietnam was visited by a significant number of important politicians from the Asia-Pacific 
region, Great Britain and the Netherlands.300 Subsequently, Vietnam started to integrate itself 
internationally in the following years. In July 1993 IMF and World Bank support was 
increased. In the end and despite severe reservations from leaders of Indonesia and the 
Philippines, which “expressed concern over whether Hanoi would be able to conduct its 
regional affairs independently of Chinese preferences on such matters as the ARF and the 
settlement of the various maritime disputes”301 – ASEAN leaders wanted Vietnam to resolve 
these issues through the association and not bilaterally which was in contrast to the 
Vietnamese foreign policy approach - Vietnam became an ASEAN member in 1995. Vietnam 
also applied to the GATT/WTO on 4 January 1995 and became a full member of the WTO in 
January 2007 after 14 Meetings of the Working Party.  
Vietnam’s goal was to maintain healthy relationships with all major parties involved in 
Southeast Asia. Good foreign relations increase the country’s security. This holds true for 
relations with both China and the United States. However, the Vietnamese considered the 
United States as a military counterpart to an emerging China and speculate that, if China uses 
military action, Washington will step in and contain the Chinese threat and they were 
“depressed by their growing economic dependence on China for consumer goods and 
industrial equipment,…”302 They also did so because they wanted to satisfy not only China, 
but the other important nations in the region as well. Until the turn of the century, Vietnamese 
leaders tended more towards China than the United States for ideological reasons, despite 
China’s refusal to cooperate on this basis. But recently, and especially since the American 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 showed Vietnamese leaders that the U.S. were still stronger than 
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Russia, China, India, or Germany and France, who could not stop it, they started to tend 
towards United States 303 
Border Treaty 
As we know, China and Vietnam have a long history, with the latter being part of the 
Chinese empire for several decades. I have already elaborated on the fact that political 
cooperation with China sought Vietnam was the result of Soviet Russia’s demise. The 
Vietnamese government did not only approach China to negotiate a deal that would make 
both countries brothers in arms based on ideology, but it did also approach Beijing in order to 
resolve other issues than the conflict in the South China Sea that Hanoi thought might be a 
source of conflict with its northern neighbor.  
The principal reason for the border conflict between the two neighbors was that 
borderline landmarks dated back to the years after the Sino-French War (1884/1885) during 
which the French acquired the Tonkin region. Since the borderline was marked only vaguely 
its pathway became increasingly unclear to follow and a line drawn on a map simply too 
inaccurate and “a small adjustment could result in a big difference [on site]”304 Both sides 
understood that the most important question to achieve any further goals was to establish a 
borderline that both sides accepted in the long run. The Land Border Treaty (LBT) was signed 
in 2002 and it was agreed that the border would be in a state of mutual agreement by 2005.  
There were two reasons why both parties expected the setting up the new border to 
take three years. Frist, the old border was still sown with mines from the war which (including 
other military infrastructure such as watch towers) had to be removed along the 1,400 km 
long border, and second, the number of new landmarks that were to be planted was around 
2,000.305 In the end, the border was to be ready in 2008, three years behind schedule, as the 
operations turned out to be more dangerous and complicated than anticipated. The resolution 
of the border conflict, which had already resulted into a bloody conflict in 1979, was therefore 
for both nation of interest to be resolved.  
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Thuy points out that initially, both nations had an interest to put an end to this dispute, 
as both countries were politically isolated from the West in 1991 – China was isolated due to 
the Tiananmen Square incident and Vietnam exposed to an American embargo that had 
starved the country for decades. 306  Furthermore, the Chinese government realized that 
Vietnam’s desire to modernize quickly was its chance to get access to the ASEAN region. In 
addition it could get rid of one problem quickly and without a serious commitment of its 
capabilities for this matter, which, in turn, meant that these (capabilities) could be used 
somewhere else. 
Infrastructure 
China does not only use trade and military presence to inxrease its influence in the 
region but also invests heavily in other Southeast Asian countries infrastructure. For example, 
China has signed multiple bilateral contracts since the early 1990s with countries from the 
Greater Mekong Subregion (mainly with Laos and Myanmar, and to a lesser extend with the 
region’s other nations too) to build a railway network and other infrastructure projects that 
encompasses the entire region.307 There are three reasons why China puts more weight on this. 
The first reason of expanding its trade network is obvious and has already been mentioned a 
couple of times in this paper. Again, I would like to point out that expanding the Sino trade 
network (while maintaining a trade surplus) causes not only a strengthening of China’s 
economy, but also a weakening of other countries which lose trade to the People’s Republic 
mostly in the low-tech and manufacturing sectors. Second, rising transportations costs erode 
profits. Subsequently, rising oil prices leads to transporting goods with ships becoming too 
expensive over time which is why a growing number of enterprises started to move their 
production back home (mostly in the United States) or to a country with lower costs.308 The 
upgrade of the ancient highway network in the region alone did not suffice to handle to 
massive trade flow and an expansion was inevitable. In the end, transporting goods on trains 
will lower average costs and foster trade even further. 
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The main reason China gets involved is purely strategic. First, a functioning railway 
network helps China to circumnavigate the street of Malacca and the South China Sea to 
supply its economy. China supports Myanmar and builds at least one deep-sea harbor, which 
will not only support the flow of goods through a Chinese-controlled area but also offers the 
opportunity to station Naval forces in the future.309 These, in turn, can secure China’s main 
trading routes along its “string of pearls”. Second, a developed (and functioning) railway 
network throughout the region is therefore in China’s interest as it allows Beijing to send 
military forces to countries that need to be rectified politically.This would not be anything 
from a (relatively) strong nation. The United States have brought democracy to several 
countries, such as Chile (1973), Panama (1989, and Iraq (2003), whenever it deemed it 
necessary. This means that if, for example, Vietnam does not abide to Chinese demands and 
goals and if this conflict escalates from a diplomatic to a military one, China has multiple 
options (Laos, Myanmar) through which it can invade its southern neighbor in addition to 
crossing the common border or an invasion from the sea. 
Mekong River 
Another example of infrastructure development is the Mekong River which runs from 
the Tibetan Plateau more than 4,300 km south until it enters the South China Sea in Vietnam. 
As the largest river in the region it is of great importance to the countries it runs through for 
various reasons. While northern countries such as Cambodia and Lao clearly benefit from 
China’s involvement in building dams that supply energy to the region, Vietnam’s inhabitants 
along the river have experienced a profound change of their living conditions. The Mekong 
River has always been a major source of food supply, especially for Vietnam’s population, 
but China’s lust for energy has had devastating effects so far. Like their Thai and Cambodian 
counterparts in the north, Vietnamese fishermen and farmers find the environment to grow 
rice and catch their quota of fish more and more hostile. The importance of the river for 
Vietnamese food production becomes evident if one considers the fact that eight out of ten 
Vietnamese living in the Mekong Delta “depend on the river subsistence, either in terms of 
the fish caught from the river or in terms of agriculture.”310 
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Building hydropower plants throughout the region has thus very significant 
implications for the nations involved. Clearly, China’s involvement in these energy programs 
is seen by the Mekong Subregion states as a very positive sign for several reasons. First, as an 
economy grows, its energy consumption grows as well. Thus, China’s money is appreciated 
very much as the assurance of energy supply helps the respective nation to continue its 
economic growth. For example a factory that is no longer in danger of falling victim to a 
blackout during working hours simply produces more goods. 
Therefore, countries from the Mekong Region are in fact in a miserable situation. On 
the one side they want to develop their economy as quickly as possible in order not to fall 
(further) behind other developed (South) East Asian nations such as Singapore. In the case of 
Vietnam the reluctance to work closely together with the United States for ideological reasons 
still prevails in the government. Since their number was relatively small so far, it has been 
very difficult for reformists to counterbalance the group of Communist politicians. 
Furthermore, the aftermath of the Vietnam War can still be felt in the country which causes 
politicians and the population alike to distrust the United States despite all the efforts from the 
American side during the 1990s, when, for example, the State Department helped their 
Vietnamese counterparts to establish diplomatic facilities and showed them how to run such a 
facility efficiently. 
The other option would be to bandwagon with the emerging China. This would not be 
a bad idea since China wants to get access to the region anyway. However, despite the 
appreciation of China’s economic development support, the countries concerns – especially 
Vietnam’s – over various issues grew significantly since the turn of the 20th century. Not only 
the fear of economic dependency and the worries that China might one day continue its 
politics with other means than diplomatic meetings that I have already elaborated on are of 
concern, but also the fact that the Mekong River has been plastered with dams built by 
China.311  
In particular there are three points connected to the hydropower plants that cause 
distress. First, despite the ever increasing number of these facilities, China diverts a 
significant amount of electricity home since the beginning of its own program in 1995.312 
Thus, it uses these countries mostly as a supply base for its own economy. The crux of the 
matter is that, in addition to those in the other countries, China builds even larger dams in 
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Yunnan province, which it claims are (besides energy production, or course) built to control 
the amount of water in the river and thus helps to contain floodings.313  
Second, among all countries through which the Mekong River flows, Cambodia and 
Vietnam are affected the most environmentally. The numerous dams upriver have a 
significant impact on water levels and irrigation. Especially Vietnam, where a significant 
amount of the population depends on the river, is worried about the environmental impact 
China’s involvement in the regions has. This is despite China’s presence is intended by the 
Chinese government to convince its southern neighbors - and consequently other countries in 
Southeast Asia (and the world) - that it is pursuing a peaceful path of growth.  
Third, while the ASEAN Power Grid programs were initiated on the basis of mutual 
cooperation among the ASEAN member states and despite the signing of contracts with China, 
the latter does not really care. Since 1990, and especially since the turn of the century, China 
considered itself stronger compared to other nations in the region. As a result it simply 
ignores contracts that it deems hindering on its path to regional domination. For example, 
when Chinese authorities began planning of the dams in the 1980s they did so unilaterally and 
did not consider environmental costs.314 And why should they? Controlling the water flow of 
the Mekong River is a very powerful bargaining chip. In times of peace, other nations will 
have to pay for energy, the construction of dams by Chinese companies, and in the future 
maybe even for the supply of water. In a conflict situation, the Chinese simply “turns off the 
water” in order to get what they want. 
South China Sea 
As already showed above, the South China Sea is the center of competition among 
ASEAN nations and China. Vietnam is the country that is affected the most of all countries by 
China’s rise since its claims are the same as China’s concerning the islands in the South China 
Sea.315 Furthermore, Vietnam, together with China and the Philippines, is one of the biggest 
claimants of territory. And like its northern neighbor, Hanoi’s claims are founded on historical 
documents. It government claims that it has ruled (at least over the Paracel Islands) since the 
17th century and that it has, contrary to China, announced its claims to the international 
community. 
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China’s claims are based on both, historical documents and the Cairo Declaration 
which returned land taken by Japanese forces from China to their native owner. However, 
both sources do not support China’s claims. The historical documents Beijing bases it claims 
onrefer to a province that is located in the northern part of Vietnam today. 316 Plus, the Cairo 
Declaration only states “that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as 
Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.”317 
Neither the Spratly Islands, nor the Paracel Islands are mentioned in the document. Even 
Article 2 (f) of the Treaty of San Francisco in 1951 merely stated that “Japan renounces all 
right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands”318 Again, there is no 
indication that China is the (recognized) owner of the island groups.  
Occupation of islands 
While the Philippines already occupied islands in 1968, there has been an intense race 
among Malaysia, the Philippines, China, Taiwan and Vietnam to occupy islands since the 
mid-1970 when President Marcos of the Philippines claimed the Kalayaan Island group for its 
country for economic reasons.319 Especially in 1988, when Vietnam occupied and established 
military facilities on these islands in order to consolidate its claims, occupying islands seemed 
to be of great importance to these countries. To occupy as many Spratly islands as possible 
was a move by the Vietnamese to follow China’s example, which occupy the Paracel Islands 
since 1974 when they took them by force from Vietnam. 
The occupation of these islands, as weird as it may seem to station soldiers on a sand 
bank, is of crucial importance to each nation for several reasons. For example, if Vietnam sets 
a flag on a deserted island, it does not guarantee that China will not take it. But, if Vietnam 
stations troops on that island, it will be impossible for China to take control of it without 
provoking a military escalation. Therefore, the stationing of troops aims at scaring off rivals. 
Another way to see it is that a territory that is not occupied by anyone does not belong to 
anyone. Stationing troops on a sand bank or an island of 1 Acre is therefore no different as it 
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provides a relatively secure opportunity to build naval stations and deploy ships in the future 
which increases the respective country’s military strength in the region further. 
2005 incident  
Over the years, and especially since the turn of the century, the region has experienced 
increased Chinese naval activities in order to enforce its territorial claims. This happened 
despite Beijing’s official position that it wants to resolve any dispute with the respective 
claimant bilaterally. For example, in 2005 Chinese ships killed 9 Vietnamese fishermen in the 
Gulf of Tonkin despite the fact that the Vietnamese ships carried their country’s flags, while 
the Chinese ships (allegedly) hid their flags quickly in order to blur traces.320 The Chinese 
government, on the other side, claimed that this act was one of self-defense as “pirates” 
threatened Chinese fishing boats in Chinese waters.321 This incident shows that China has the 
capabilities to take a two-tracked approach. On the one side it wants to be considered the 
reliable and reputable partner that can guarantee peace and stability. At the same time, the 
Chinese government pursues its strategies, like most other countries (in the region), with 
military force if need be.  
Looking outside the region 
In addition to internal and inter-regional efforts by the Vietnamese government to 
counterbalance China’s increasing presence and influence in the region, Vietnam (like 
ASEAN) has tried to bring in powers from outside. Beside the United States, Vietnam has 
also sought to maintain and expand its friendly relationship with India throughout the years. 
Relations between the two countries were set up in 1972 because of their common distrust 
towards China. On the Indian side, the distrust towards China stems from the fact that the two 
countries are having a territorial dispute for several decades now and that India wants to 
become a major player internationally itself. 
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While military cooperation was limited until the 1990s – Indian delegations only 
visited Vietnam after the 1979-war with China to study Vietnamese defense behavior against 
Chinese troops322 - the year 2000 marked a change when both countries signed a Protocol on 
Defense Cooperation. China’s rise and the collapse of the Soviet Union has bound Vietnam 
and India closer together as opposition towards an alliance with the United States for either, 
ideological reasons, or the preference to bring in a local power as strong partner, is still a 
popular option. 
Karambelkar points out that traditionally  
“India and Vietnam defence relations are characterised by high level bilateral 
visits, training of personnel, assistance in defence production, sharing of 
intelligence and joint exercises. A joint working group on terrorism was 
established in the framework of strategic partnership agreement. Terrorism is 
a challenge for India where it is benefitting from Vietnam’s expertise in 
counter insurgency and asymmetric warfare. India and Vietnam are maritime 
neighbours having common concerns like piracy and security of sea lines of 
communication.”323  
Furthermore, cooperating with India also makes sense in the context of Vietnamese balancing 
strategy of diversifying is security net. As a result of increasing cooperation India signed a 
“Joint Declaration on Framework of Comprehensive Cooperation” in 2003 and a “Strategic 
Partnership Agreement” in 2007.  
In the end, both parties needed and benefited from cooperating with each other. In 
addition to military cooperation in the fields named above, Kumar points out that “India needs 
Vietnamese cooperation in countering China in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean 
region”324 Thus, as both countries share the same opponent their cooperation should be of no 
surprise. However, neither can be sure that the other one will stick with the commitments 
agreed upon forever. In case one of them finds a more compelling alternative to their 
cooperation, relations will start to deteriorate. For example, if Vietnamese integrationists get 
totally isolated or even repelled from the government as Communist hardliner take over 
power, a drift of Vietnam away from India, the United States and possibly the ASEAN 
towards China would be a likely scenario.  
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Summary 
The resolving of the border issue helped both countries. On the one side, Vietnam 
thought itself safe and could increase its trade, as indicated above, with China significantly. 
On the other side, China also got what it wanted, especially with Vietnam’s accession to 
ASEAN: access to the ASEAN markets and a potential outpost. In addition, the fact that 
Vietnam depends more on Chinese exports that the other way around supports Beijing’s goal 
to get the region under control. If, at some point in the future, Vietnam does not abide to 
Chinese demands in the future it simply cuts supplies or invades its southern neighbor(s).  
Yet, in 2008, China’s position was seemingly not strong enough to consider this an 
option as there were no signs of such a behavior until then. Nevertheless, China’s economic 
emergence, which is expected to continue by both, the Chinese government and foreign 
analysts, will at some point in the future be one of its biggest strategic advantages. This 
development will be fueled by the increasing imbalance of trade between China and the 
various countries. Vietnamese leaders were already concerned before 2008 that the 
continuation of increasing imports and investment (through infrastructure projects) from 
China could make the country too dependent. 
On the other side, China showed two different faces between 1990 and 2008. While 
the government focused on appearing as a neighbor who wants nothing but peace, stability 
and prosperity for all nations in the region through cooperation, before turn of the 20th century. 
Rather, China’s appearance in the region (and the world) has become more aggressive and 
self-confident since then. It has managed to get its foot into some East Asian countries and 
become an important player in the region. As a consequence, it rhetoric towards Japan, and 
the United States in particular has become more hostile.  
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Chapter 4 – Conclusion and Outlook 
Conclusion 
I have tried to show that China’s emergence, particularly after 1990, poses a very 
serious threat not only for the United States, the sole super power left after the demise of the 
Soviet Union, but also in particular for China’s neighbors in East Asia. While more and more 
people, scientists and other analysts alike, are attracted to studying the Chinese emergence, 
nobody should be surprised by China’s emergence though. As Maddison showed, China was 
already the largest country in the world (measured in GDP) around 1820, when it held a share 
in world GDP of 32.9%.325 However, China lost the leadership position in the decades up to 
1890, when its share in world GDP had declined to 13.2%.326  
Total humiliation followed when the Chinese Empire was overpowered and forced by 
Western nations to sign the so called “unequal treaties”. Even after 1890 China’s decline 
continued and reached its lowest point in 1978 with a share in world GDP of 4.9%.327 Since 
then the country has undergone a tremendous process as the government managed to increase 
the share in in world GDP to 15.3% in 2003.328 As a result, China’s confidence has returned 
together with China’s economic comeback. The impact on other countries can thus neither be 
neglected, nor disregarded as insignificant, as China is on the way to (re)build its empire. 
However, what is really astounding is the pace at which the Chinese government 
manages to develop the country’s capabilities. Besides the Soviet Union, no other country has 
managed moving up the power ladder so quickly. The difference between China and its once 
brother-in-arms, is though that, contrary to Soviet Russia, first, the People’s Republic is seen 
by many as a new super power that could replace the United States as the strongest nation in 
the world system. Second, so far concerns that China’s emergence is not sustainable have 
been limited while it was clear that the fall of Soviet Russia would only be a matter of time. 
When the Soviet Union fell apart, governments all over the world realized the 
magnitude of the impact this would have. In particular those Southeast Asian countries, such 
as Vietnam, that were not integrated into the world economy and had lost their (ideological) 
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patron, had to find a new way to ensure their survival in a very hostile region. Others, such as 
Singapore and Taiwan have already realized that integrating into the world markets would not 
only provide an opportunity to develop the country, but also to make sure that the United 
States would protect them in case of an attack in the 1970s. After Mao’s death some of 
China’s political leaders also had realized that the country’s security would, in the long run, 
depend on whether or not it would develop economically and catch up as Beijing’s fallout 
with Moscow had led to total isolation. 
Between the start of the Reform Era in 1978 and 1990, when the Chinese government 
initiated another round of reforms, many of which were connected to the GATT/WTO 
accession demands coming from Western nations (and the United States in particular), 
China’s engagement of the (South) East Asian region was very limited since Beijing did not 
consider it strong enough to challenge the main powers Japan and the United States. Rather, 
its focus was to develop the internal capabilities and ensure the political stability of the nation.  
However, China’s engagement with and rhetoric towards other nations in the region 
and the United States has changed dramatically between 1990 and 2008 due to China’s 
economic emergence. China developed a two-tracked approach towards others. While the 
initial attempt was to achieve its goals convincing the other side with diplomatic reasoning 
(and money), the government has expanded military operations in the South China Sea since 
the turn of the 20th century to express its ambitions. Nevertheless, diplomatic actions and 
economic cooperation remained the primary approach. Filled with the money it makes from 
trading, China warchest became huge between opening the country in 1978 and 2008. 
Especially China’s accession to the WTO at the end of 2001 caused the trade balance to tilt in 
the People’s Republic’s favor. 
Subsequently, this gave the government both, the ability to further develop the 
country’s capabilities and the chance to focus on its foreign goals, while still attracting 
massive inflows of foreign capital. Furthermore, China was in a fortunate situation that ten 
years before its WTO accession several Southeast Asian nations, including Vietnam, started 
to look outward and where therefore in need of financial support and markets to get engaged 
with in order to maintain internal stability. Thus, the Chinese government seized the moment 
and started to promote economic cooperation in the region. 
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Cooperation was mainly focused on building up the infrastructure in the respective 
country and on trade. Thus, China supported the other country’s development while it created 
a setting that made the country dependent. For example, the construction of the railway 
system in the Greater Mekong Subregion helps its own goals, as well as the countries Chinese 
companies build the rails in. The expansion of the railway system helps GMS countries to 
increase trade among each other and with China, thus spurring their economic development. 
China, on the other side, gets a piece of the cake as well. Not only will the countries have to 
bear the construction costs. They will also buy more Chinese goods in the future. Most 
importantly, however, is the fact that a debtor is bound to the creditor and has to comply with 
the latter’s demands. Therefore, getting involved in the development process was one was for 
China to increase its sphere of influence.  
China’s desire to increase its reach in the region is also evident in the fact that the 
Chinese government prefers to sign agreements with ASEAN members on a bilateral basis in 
all areas. Cooperation in security matters between the ASEAN members China was very 
limited before 2010 to “combating drug trafficking, illegal immigration, piracy, terrorism, 
arms smuggling, money laundering, international economic and cyber crimes and other 
transnational crimes.”329 However, it seems that ASEAN nations have a different view on 
how peace in the region should be preserved. While China wants the United States (and Japan) 
out of the region, and sees military cooperation with ASEAN members to better defend its 
own sovereignty330, ASEAN members do not share this view. They rater seek close relations 
with powers, mostly the United States, and also India, from outside the region to ensure 
stability.331  
The period between 1990 and 2008 was one that brought significant challenges to the 
world’s sole super power, the United States. China’s emergence definitely did not go so far as 
to threaten the position of the U.S. in the region, least in the world. However, the gap between 
the two countries has narrowed significantly during that period because of China’s 
continuously high rate of economic growth. Furthermore, the economic stagnancy of the 
United States and other Western powers gave Asian nations reason to believe that China 
might be a viable alternative. However, it seems that during the observed period, these nations 
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swayed, at least before the turn of the century, back and forth between the two nations. 
Despite the gains China provided to (South) East Asian nations, most, like Vietnam, have 
already come to realize that China might in the (near) future turn to military action once it 
develops these capabilities. 
Thus, military exercises with the United States have more importance than (military) 
cooperation with China. Furthermore, ASEAN nations also started to consider India as a third 
option to help them maintain stability in the region and contain a potential Chinese threat. In 
my opinion, ASEAN nations, despite their differences between each other, realized that 
aligning with either U.S. or China has its price as tensions rose between the two to new 
heights. Especially since 2005, China’s rhetoric towards the United States became more 
aggressive as Beijing openly denies Washington any voice in conflicts, such as the South 
China Sea dispute or Human Rights.  
Despite its efforts, Vietnam’s economic development has not lifted the country to new 
heights and it still lags far behind other countries. This holds true particularly with China, as 
Beijing outgrew the gap between the two increased over the years. Vietnam has become more 
and more dependent on its northern neighbor and some (politicians and policy makers) were 
already expressing concern of this dependency in the past. As a result, the government 
undertook actions to develop its naval forces in order to being able to defy Chinese aggressive 
behavior in the South China Sea. However, the Vietnamese had one advantage: they already 
knew that China would become more and more aggressive over time and that they could 
never contain it alone. Subsequently, Hanoi’s approach to build a security net that involves all 
major nations as well as ASEAN and even India is both, logic and smart.  
Outlook 
So far China is not strong enough to openly challenge the United States with any 
military means so far. The fact that Beijing announced in 2010 that it was ready to conduct 
full scale military operations with the Philippines, despite Manila’s close relations with the 
United States and its (partially) open criticism of Chinese actions332 shows three things. First, 
China is about to build up a network (and draw nations away from the U.S.) that ensures 
military support from other nations in case that open (military) conflict with the United States 
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breaks out. Second, Asian nations (already) see a threat in China’s rise. Like the Philippines, 
other countries in the region have either kept their ties with Washington, or intensified 
cooperation in order to balance the Chinese emergence. 
Third the size of military operations conducted between China and an ASEAN 
member are still small compared to other exercises and are signaling that China’s relations 
with most countries are still at the beginning. For example, the Sino-Thai “Blue Assault-2010” 
was an anti-terrorism exercise aimed at helping both sides to learn from each other.333 Since 
then military exercises, such as the Sino-Vietnamese joint patrol in Beibu Gulf to strengthen 
the ties between the two countries and to ensure a peaceful region334, have become more 
frequent. 
There are several insecurities that remain for all parties involved and that might cause 
instability in the region. First of all, China’s nontransparent behavior has already caused great 
distrust towards Beijing. For example, the government’s constant understatement and lack of 
transparency concerning its military budget and military developments simply cannot be 
understood as an act of self-defense. Rather, nations that hide something are considered to be 
dangerous or most likely will become dangerous to other nations in the future. The fact that 
assessments about China’s military strength and its capabilities are not based on sound 
information does not help China to be considered a trustworthy partner that seeks peace and 
stability. 
Instead of becoming a peaceful Asian giant, China will most likely become a hungry 
dragon and use large scale military action in the future, like any other powerful nation in 
history did. However, there is still a time window of 5 to 10 years for the rest of the world, but 
most importantly for the United States, to take counterbalancing actions before the Chinese 
government has upgraded its forces and introduced nuclear submarines and aircraft carries 
around 2020. And even then, the PLA’s true capabilities are questionable as it lacks combat 
experience. Nevertheless, there will be plenty of opportunities for the Chinese navy to learn 
and improve in the South China Sea when it engages states such as the Vietnam or the 
Philippines in the struggle for unoccupied islands. 
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For ASEAN, the threat is that China manages to undermine the Association’s political 
framework and takes on each country separately. Furthermore, members will have to make 
sure that no other member officially sides with China as well since this would also mean that 
the already fragile network might dissolve. ASEAN as a whole should rather take Vietnam’s 
security approach as an example and try to bring in as many major powers into the region as 
possible, despite China’s opposition. But they would have to move quickly to bring in India, 
keep the U.S. and bring back Japan to create a stable environment, because once China has 
passed the point until which its ambitions can be contained, (South) East Asian nations will 
face severe dependency issues and will have to fear China’s military interventions as well 
without any chance of help from the outside. 
As much as China is trying to convince the world, and Asian nations in particular, that 
its rise is a peaceful one – and that it will be peaceful in the future as well– we must always 
keep in mind Mearsheimer’s words:  
“Talk is cheap”335 
  
                                                 
335 Mearsheimer, The Gathering Storm, p.383 
 102 
 
Bibliography 
Books & Articles 
Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia. ASEAN and the 
problem of regional order (New York, 2009) 
 
Richard M. Auty, Industrial Policy Reform in China. Structural and Regional Imbalances. In: 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol.17, No.4 (1992), 
pp.481- 494 
 
Paul J. Bailey, China in the Twentieth Century (Malden, MA, USA 2001) 
 
William A. Callahan, Chinese Visions of World Order. Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony? 
In: International Studies Review No. 10 (2008), pp.749-761 
 
Joseph C.H. Chai, China. Transition to a market economy (Oxford, 1998) 
 
Chung Ch’i-fu, Lectures on National Economic Planning. Lecture 3: Methods in Formulating 
National Economic Plans. In: Nicholas R. Lardy (Ed.), Chinese Economic Planning. 
Translations From Chi-Hua Ching-Chi (New York 1977, 1978), pp.6-14 
 
Karl von Clausewitz, On War. In: Sun Tzu, Karl von Clausewitz, The Book of War. Sun-Tzu's 
"The Art of War" & Karl Von Clausewitz's "On War" (New York, 2000), pp.249-984 
 
Jason Dedrick, Kenneth L. Kraemer, Greg Linden, Who captures the Value in a Global 
Innovation System? The case of Apple‘s iPod. In: The Personal Computing Industry Center 
(2007) 
 
Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, UK, 1981) 
 
Evelyn Goh, China in the Mekong River Basin. The Regional Security Implications of 
resource development on the Lancang Jiang. In: The Institute of Defence and Strategic 
Studies No.69 (Singapore, July 2004) 
 
Allan E. Goodman, Vietnam and ASEAN. Who would have thought it possible? In: Asian 
Survey, Vol.36, No.6 (June 1996), pp. 592-600 
 
Allan E. Goodman, Vietnam in 1994. With peace at hand. In: Asian Survey, Vol.35, No.1, A 
Survey of Asia in 1994: Part I (January, 1995), pp.92-99 
 
Yu Guangyuan, Accomplishments and Problems. China’s reform in the past twenty-three 
years. In: Tian Yu Cao (ed.), The Chinese Model of Modern Development (London, New 
York 2005), pp.23-53 
 
Rongxing Guo, How the Chinese Economy works. A Multiregional Overview (New York, 
1999) 
 
 103 
 
Joseph Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation. A Realist Critique of the Newest 
Liberal Institutionalism. In: International Organization, Vol.42, No.3 (Summer, 1988), 
pp.485-507 
 
Joseph Grieco, Robert Powell, Duncan Snidal, The Relative-Gains Problem for International 
Cooperation. In: The American Political Scence Review, Vol.87, No.3 (Sep., 1993), pp.727-
743 
 
Philip Donal Grub, Lin Hai, Foreign Direct Investment in China (New York, 1991) 
 
Darryl S.L. Jarvis, Anthony Welch (Eds.), ASEAN Industries and the Challenge from China 
(London/New York, 2011) 
 
Robert Jervis, Realism, Theory, and Cooperation. In: World Politics, Vol.40, No.3 (April, 
1998), pp.317-349 
 
Pankaj Kumar Jha, India’s Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia. In: Journal of Defence 
Studies (JDS), Vol.5. No.1 (January, 2011), pp.47-63 
 
Robert O. Keohane, Lisa Martin, How International Institutions affect Outcomes. In: Ernest R. 
May, Richard Rosecrance, and Zara Steiner (eds.), History and Neorealism (Cambridge, UK, 
2010), pp.49-77 
 
Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions. Can Interdependence work? In: Foreign Policy, 
No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring, 1998), pp.82-96+194 
 
Robert Keohane, Theory of World Politics. Structural Realism and Beyond. In: Robert O. 
Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (New York, 1986), pp.158-203 
 
Dylan Kissane, 2015 and the Rise of China: Power Cycle Analysis and the Implications for 
Australia. In: Security Challenges, Vol.1 (November, 2005), No.1, pp.105-121  
 
Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945–2010. In: 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (2010, 66: 77) 
 
Sushil Kumar, Power Cycle Analysis of India, China, and Pakistan in Regional and Global 
Policies. In: International Political Science Review Vol. 24, No. 1, Power Cycle Theory and 
Global Politics (Jan. 2003), pp.113-122 
 
Nicholas R. Lardy, Integrating China into the Global Economy (Washington D.C., 2002) 
 
Christopher Layne, The Unipolar Illusion Revisited. The Coming End of the United States’ 
Unipolar Moment. In: International Security, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Fall, 2006), pp.7–41 
 
Choh-Ming Li, China's Industrial Development 1958-63. In: The China Quarterly No. 17 (Jan. 
- Mar., 1964), pp.3-38 
 
Chong Yah Lim, Southeast Asia. The Long Road Ahead. 3rd Edition (Singapore, 2009) 
 
 104 
 
Justin Yifu Lin, Economic Reform and development strategy in China. Strategic issues and 
quantitative assessments. In: Peter Drysdale, Ligang Song (eds.), China’s Entry to the WTO. 
Strategic issues and quantitative assessments (London, 2000), pp.30-52 
 
Justin Yifu Lin, Rural Reforms and Agricultural Growth in China. In: The American 
Economic Review, Vol.82, No.1 (March, 1992), pp.34-51 
 
Shaohua Ma, China’s multilateralism and the South China Sea conflict. Quest for Hegemonic 
stability? (Singapore, 2006) 
 
Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince. In: Christian E. Detmold, Historical, Political, and 
Diplomatic Writings of Niccolo Machiavelli, Vol. II (Boston, 1882), pp.1-92 
 
Angus Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run. Second Edition, Revised, 
and Updated, 960-2030 AD (Paris, 2007) 
 
John W. McManus, The Spratly Islands. A Maritime Park? In: Ambio, Vol.23, No.3 (May, 
1994), pp.181-186 
 
John Mearsheimer, The Gathering Storm. China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia. In: The 
Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol.3 (2010), p.381-396 
 
Helen Milner, International Political Economy: Beyond Hegemonic Stability. In: Foreign 
Policy. No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring, 1998), pp.112-123 
 
Yang Mu, Heng Siam-Heng, China-ASEAN Relations after CAFTA. In: Mingjiang Li, Chong 
Guan Kwa (eds.), China-ASEAN Sub-Regional Cooperation. Progress, Problems, and 
Prospect (Singapore, 2011), pp.125-142 
 
Barry Naughton, A Political Economy of China’s Economic Transition. In: Loren Brandt, 
Thomas G. Rawski (Eds.), China’s Great Economic Transformation (New York, 2008), pp.91-
135 
 
Barry Naughton, Growing out of the Plan. Chinese Econmic Refrom 1978 – 1993 (New York, 
1995) 
 
Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy. Transitions and Growth (Cambridge, MA, USA 
2007) 
 
Barry Naughton, The Third Front. Defence Industrialization in the Chinese Interior. In: The 
China Quarterly, No.115 (Sep., 1988), pp.351-386 
 
OECD Country Surveys, Economic Surveys. China 2005 (Paris, 2005) 
 
John M. Owen, Domestically driven Deviations. Internal Regimes, Leaders, and Realism’s 
Power Line. In: Ernest R. May, Richard Rosecrance, and Zara Steiner (eds.), History and 
Neorealism (Cambridge, UK, 2010), pp.29-48 
 
Christopher J. Pehrson, String of Pearls. Meeting the challenge of China’s rising power across 
the Asian littoral (July, 2006) 
 
 105 
 
Phua Peipei, Hydropower Development in the Mekong Region. In: Mingjiang Li, Chong 
Guan Kwa (eds.), China-ASEAN Sub-Regional Cooperation. Progress, Problems, and 
Prospect (Singapore, 2011), pp.95-124 
 
Richard Rosecrance, Transformations of Power. In: Ernest R. May, Richard Rosecrance, and 
Zara Steiner (eds.), History and Neorealism (Cambridge, UK, 2010), pp.8-28 
 
Yang Shengming, The WTO and China’s Trade Strategies in the 1990s. In: Peter Drysdale, 
Ligang Song (eds.), China’s Entry to the WTO. Strategic issues and quantitative assessments 
(London, 2000), pp.53-65 
 
Do Thi Thuy, The Implementation of Vietnam-China Land Border Treaty. Bilateral and 
Regional Implications. In: RSIS Working Paper Series, No.173 (Singapore, 5 March 2009) 
 
Ari Van Assche, Chang Hong, Veerle Slootmaekers, China’s International Competitiveness. 
Reassessing the Evidence. In: LICOS Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance 
Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper 205 (2008) 
 
Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics. A Modern Approach (New York, USA, 2003) 
 
Raimo Väyrynen, Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Domestic Political Systems. In: Journal of 
Peace Research, Vol.32, No.3 (August 1995), pp. 361-371 
 
Alexander L. Vuving, Strategy and Evolution of Vietnam’s China Policy. A Changing mixture 
of pathways. In: Asian Survey, Vol.46, No.6 (November/December 2006), pp. 805-824 
 
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading Mass., USA, 1979) 
 
Donald E. Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia. The Struggle for Autonomy 
(Oxford, 2005) 
 
Documents 
ASEAN, Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (04.11.2002). Online: 
http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm (accessed: 18.05.2012) 
 
Cairo Declaration (01.12.1943). Online: 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/002_46/002_46tx.html (accessed: 01.06.2012) 
 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations. Market Access for Goods and Services: Overview of the Results (Geneva, 
Nov. 1994). Online: http://www.ub.edu/prometheus21/articulos/archivos/gatt.PDF (accessed: 
05.06.2012) 
 
Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong. 
In: The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, The Constitutional 
and Mainland Affairs Bureau. Online: http://www.cmab.gov.hk/en/issues/jd2.htm (accessed: 
07.06.2012) 
 
 106 
 
Mark E. Manyin, Kim Jong-Il’s Death: Implications for North Korea’s Stability and U.S. 
Policy. In: CRS Report for Congress (Washington D.C., 11.01.2012). Online: 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42126.pdf (accessed: 23.01.2012) 
 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report To Congress. Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010. Online: 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf (accessed: 05.06.2012) 
 
Presidential Decrees, Presidential Decree No. 1596 - Declaring certain area part of the 
Philippine Territory and providing for their Government and Administration (11.06.1978). In: 
Chan Robles Virtual Law Library. Online: 
http://www.chanrobles.com/presidentialdecrees/presidentialdecreeno1596.html (accessed: 
22.05.2012) 
 
Treaty of San Francisco (08.09.1951). Online: 
http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm (accessed: 01.06.2012) 
 
Internet Sources 
ASEAN, ASEAN – China Dialogue Relations. Online: http://www.aseansec.org/5874.htm 
(accessed: 21.05.2012) 
 
BBC News, Q&A, South China Sea dispute (19.07.2011). Online: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349 (accessed: 06.05.2012) 
 
BBC News, Obama unveils new strategy for 'leaner' US military (05.01.2012). Online: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-16430405 (accessed: 14.05.2012) 
 
BBC News, US fears grow over China military. The US has expressed concern over China's 
growing military might (25.05.2007). Online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/6691691.stm (accessed: 12.05.2012) 
 
Farhan Bokhari, Kathrin Hille, Pakistan turns to China for naval base (22.05.2011). Online: 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3914bd36-8467-11e0-afcb-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1umonp2Me 
(accessed: 10.05.2012) 
 
Kevin Brass, China Limits Foreign Ownership of Property (16.11.2010). In: International 
Property Journal. Online: http://internationalpropertyjournal.com/blog/2010/11/16/283-china-
limits-foreign-ownership-of-property.html (accessed: 05.05.2012) 
 
Chris Buckley, China tells U.S. to quit as human rights judge. In: Reuters Online (10.04.2011). 
Online: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/10/us-china-usa-rights-
idUSTRE7382EH20110410 (accessed: 05.05.2012) 
 
Stanley Chan, Quiet power. ASEAN. In: Asia Times Online (10.08.2002). Online: 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/DH10Ae06.html (accessed: 21.05.2012) 
 
China Daily, China-ASEAN cooperation. 1991-2011 (16.11.2011). Online: 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-11/16/content_14101968.htm (accessed: 
18.05.2012) 
 107 
 
 
China Defense Blog, Cobra Gold With Chinese Characteristic? (20.10.2010). Online: 
http://china-defense.blogspot.com/2010/10/cobra-gold-with-chinese-characteristic.html 
(accessed: 18.05.2012) 
 
China Military Online, Chinese frigate “Xiangfang” to participate in Sino-Vietnamese joint 
patrol (01.12.2010). In: Beibu Gulf online: http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-
military-news/2010-12/01/content_4345910.htm (accessed: 18.05.2012) 
 
CNN Wire Staff; Iran says U.S. warships in Persian Gulf spawn 'mayhem'; CNN online 
(04.01.2012). Online: http://edition.cnn.com/2012/01/04/world/meast/iran-
strait/index.html?iref=allsearch (accessed: 05.01.2012) 
 
Saibal Dasgupta & Agencies, Chinese military base in Indian Ocean?, (13.12.2011). Online: 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-12-13/china/30511052_1_seychelles-drone-
base-china (accessed: 10.05.2012) 
 
Jason Dean, China Warns U.S. to Stay Out of Regional Disputes, Wall Street Journal Online 
(23.06.2011). Online: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303970604576401260613634844.html 
(accessed: 02.03.2012) 
 
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Vodafone joins queue of firms to leave China. Telecoms company 
is planning to sell its £4bn stake in China Mobile. In: The Telegraph Online (29.08.2010). 
Online: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/mediatechnologyandtelecoms/7971181/Vo
dafone-joins-queue-of-firms-to-leave-China.html (accessed: 25.04.2012) 
 
Robert Gilpin, Profile. In: Department of Politics, Princeton University. Online: 
http://www.princeton.edu/politics/people/display_person.xml?netid=rggilpin&display=faculty 
(accessed: 07.06.2012) 
 
Global Security, Cobra Gold. Online: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/cobra-
gold.htm (accessed: 03.05.2012) 
 
Global Security, Exercise Balikatan. "Shouldering the Load Together". Online: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/balikatan.htm (accessed: 03.05.2012) 
 
Global Security, Territorial claims in the Spratly and Paracel Islands. Online: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/spratly-claims.htm (accessed: 01.06.2012) 
 
GMA News, RP reviews North Luzon Railways contract with China's CNMEG (03.10.2010). 
Online: http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/202597/economy/rp-reviews-north-luzon-
railways-contract-with-china-s-cnmeg (accessed: 19.05.2012) 
 
Indian Military, Navy to host 14-nation Milan exercise from Feb 1 (31.01.2012). Online: 
http://www.indian-military.org/news-archives/indian-navy-news/1929-navy-to-host-14-
nation-milan-exercise-from-feb-1.html (accessed: 21.05.2012) 
 
Amruta Karambelkar, Indo-Vietnam Defence Relations. Strategically Responsive 
(31.01.2012). In: Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies. Online: 
 108 
 
http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/indo-vietnam-defence-relations-strategically-responsive-
3568.html (accessed: 03.06.2012) 
 
Daniel Ten Kate, China Proposes Maritime ’Network’ Fund to Help Resolve Shipping 
Disputes, Bloomberg News (20.11.2011). Online: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-
19/china-says-sea-navigation-not-a-factor-as-wen-talks-with-obama-in-bali.html (accessed: 
03.01.2012) 
 
Kirsten Korosec, Why Companies Are Leaving China, in: CBS Money Watch (26.05.2011). 
Online: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123_162-43045348/why-companies-are-leaving-
china/ (accessed: 24.05.2012) 
 
Subhash Kapila, India-Vietnam. A Convergence of Strategic Interests. In: Asia Times Online 
(11.01.2001). Online: http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/CA11Df04.html (accessed: 02.06.2012) 
 
Jens Kastner, Stealth fighter sneaks up on Taiwan. In: Asia Times Online (21.01.2011). 
Online: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MA21Ad02.html (accessed: 13.05.2012) 
 
Mae La, T.F., The South China Sea. A Sea of Disputes. In: The Economist online, Banyan 
Blog (21.02.2011). Online: http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan (accessed: 22.05.2012) 
 
Thi Lam, Massacre in the Gulf of Tonkin. Killing of Vietnamese fishermen reveals China's 
imperialist designs (11 March, 2005). In: The CBS Interactive Network Resource Library. 
Online: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1141/is_19_41/ai_n13499573/ (accessed: 
28.05.2012) 
 
Li Lubo, The Quality Drag on China's Car Industry. Chinese automakers have made great 
strides, but J.D. Power's Lubo Li says structural barriers block the way to a globally 
competitive level. In: Bloomberg Businessweek online. Online: 
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/jun2007/gb20070629_028900.htm (accessed: 
10.05.2012) 
 
Mrityunjoy Mazumdar, Bharat Rakshak, Exercise Milan 08. Friendship Across the Seas(Jan. 
2008). Online: http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/Articles/Article11.pdf (accessed: 
21.05.2012) 
 
Cao Ngo, Ngoc Minh, Chinese ships "shot to kill" Vietnamese fishermen (17.01.2005). In: 
Vietnamese Seaports Association. Online: 
http://www.vpa.org.vn/detail_temp.jsp?page=35&id=462&cate_id=21 (accessed: 28.05.2012) 
 
Joseph Nye, Asia in the Balance. In: The Korea Times online (12.01.2011). Online: 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2011/01/137_79557.html (accessed: 
24.04.2012) 
 
Joseph Nye, Has Economic Power Replaced Military Might?, In: CNN Online (06.06.2011). 
Online: http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/06/06/has-economic-power-replaced-
military-might/?iref=allsearch (accessed: 22.04.2012) 
 
Joseph Nye, Why China is weak on soft power. In: New York Times online (18.01.2012). 
Online: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/opinion/why-china-is-weak-on-soft-
power.html?_r=1 (accessed: 24.04.2012) 
 109 
 
Andrew Osborn, Crash Course in Quality for Chinese Car. Chery's Hot-Selling Amulet 
Crumples in a Russian Test, Raising Broad Safety Issue. In: Wall Street Journal Online 
(08.08.2007). Online: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118651314364590719.html (accessed: 
10.05.2012) 
 
Jeremy Page, A Chinese Stealth Challenge? In: WSJ Online (05.01.2011). Online: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703808704576061674166905408.html 
(accessed: 14.05.2012) 
 
Kathy Quiano, China, ASEAN agree on plans to solve South China Sea dispute (21.07.2011). 
In: CNN online. Online: http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-
21/world/china.sea.conflict_1_chinese-patrol-south-china-sea-vietnamese-
vessels?_s=PM:WORLD (accessed: 14.05.2012) 
 
Dexter Roberts, Why factories are leaving China. A labor shortage is trimming margins for 
exporters, who are moving to Vietnam, India, and elsewhere. In: Businessweek Online 
(13.05.2010). Online: 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_21/b4179011091633.htm (accessed: 
24.05.2012) 
 
The Economist, China coming down the tracks. A railway boom promises to tie South-East 
Asia together—and boost China’s sway (20.01.2011, from the printed edition). Online: 
http://www.economist.com/node/17965601?story_id=17965601 (accessed: 05.04.2011) 
 
The Economist, China's murky ownership rules. Who owns what? The perils of investing 
where the law is unclear (07.07.2011, from printed edition). Online: 
http://www.economist.com/node/18928526 (accessed: 05.05.2012) 
 
The Guardian Online, State of the union 2012: full transcript of President Obama's speech. 
The full text of President Barack Obama's third state of the union address to Congress on 24 
January 2012. Online: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/25/state-of-the-union-
address-full-text  (accessed: 15.05.2012) 
 
The Hankyoreh, China to build 93,000-ton atomic-powered aircraft carrier: source, 
(28.03.2007; Modified on: 29.032007). Online: 
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/199284.html (accessed: 
06.05.2012) 
 
U.S. Energy Information Agency (USEIA), Country Analysis Brief China. Online: 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=CH#coal (accessed: 23.02.2012) 
 
Kevin Voigt, China-Japan fight goes deeper than islands (22.09.2010). In: CNN online. 
Online: http://edition.cnn.com/2010/BUSINESS/09/22/china.japan.island.dispute/index.html 
(accessed: 19.05.2012) 
 
Edward Wong, Beijing Warns U.S. about South China Sea Disputes. In: New York Times 
Online Edition (22.06.2011). Online: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/world/asia/23china.html (accessed: 02.03.2012) 
 
 110 
 
DJ Yap, China ready to hold military exercises with PH. In: The Global Inquirer (23.12.2010). 
Online: http://globalnation.inquirer.net/news/breakingnews/view/20101223-310597/China-
ready-to-hold-military-exercises-with-PH (accessed: 20.05.2012) 
 
Nick Zieminski, Big manufacturers more likely to embrace "Made in USA". Survey. In: 
Reuters Online (20.04.2012). Online: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/20/us-usa-
manufacturing-china-idUSBRE83J05Z20120420 (accessed: 24.05.2012) 
 
Statistical Sources 
ASEAN, Statistical Yearbook 2008 
 
Badan Pusat Statistic, Population of Indonesia by Province 1971, 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 
2010. Online: 
http://dds.bps.go.id/eng/tab_sub/view.php?tabel=1&daftar=1&id_subyek=12&notab=1 
(accessed: 16.05.2012) 
 
China Statistical Yearbook 1996, 16-7 China's Foreign Trade with Related Countries and 
Regions (Customs Statistics). Online: 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/YB1996e/P16-7e.htm  (accessed: 
25.05.2012) 
 
China Statistical Yearbook 2001, 17-7 China’s Foreign Trade with Related Counties and 
Territories (Customs Statistics). Online: 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/YB1998e/Q071AE.htm  (accessed: 
25.05.2012) 
 
China Statistical Yearbook 2010, 6-7 Value of Imports and Exports by Country (Region) of 
Origin/Destination. Online: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2010/indexeh.htm (accessed: 
25.05.2012) 
 
Chinese State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Foreign Exchange Reserves, 1950-2005. 
Online: 
http://www.safe.gov.cn/model_safe_en/tjsj_en/tjsj_detail_en.jsp?ID=30303000000000000,14
&id=4 (accessed: 17.04.2012) 
 
Invest in China, Annual FDI Data. Online: 
http://fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Statistics/AnnualStatisticsData/default.jsp (accessed: 
20.05.2012) 
 
ITC Trade Statistics, Bilateral Trade. Online: 
http://www.trademap.org/tradestat/Bilateral_TS.aspx (accessed: 22.01.2012) 
 
SIPRI Yearbook 1991. World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford, 1991) 
 
Flightglobal Insight, World Air Forces 2011/2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 111 
 
World Bank Data 
 
- World Bank Country Data, China. Online: http://data.worldbank.org/country/china 
(accessed: 24.01.2012) 
 
- World Bank Country Data, Japan. Online: http://data.worldbank.org/country/japan 
(accessed: 24.01.2012) 
 
- World Bank Data, Trade as % of GDP. Online: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS?order=wbapi_data_value_201
0+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=asc (accessed: 24.01.2012) 
 
- World Bank Country Data, United States. Online: 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states (accessed: 24.01.2012) 
 
- World Bank Country Data, Vietnam. Online: 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/vietnam (accessed: 24.01.2012) 
 
  
 112 
 
Abstracts 
Deutsch 
Der Aufstieg Chinas ist eine Entwicklung die mit immer größer werdender 
Wahrscheinlichkeit die politische Rangordnung der Welt durcheinander bringen und der 
Amerikanischen Vormachstellung ein Ende setzen könnte. In meiner Arbeit habe ich versucht 
anhand der neorealistischen Theorie versucht die Auswirkungen des Chinesischen Aufstiegs 
auf die Südostasiatische Region und insbesondere auf Vietnam für den Zeitraum von 1990 bis 
2008 zu untersuchen. Nach der Vorstellung der neorealistischen Theorie, habe ich zunächst 
versucht die wichtigsten Elemente der Chinesischen Transformation aufzuzeigen und habe in 
einem weiteren Schritt versucht diese quantitativ darzustellen, um so die relative Position der 
Nationen zueinander bestimmen zu können. 
Ich habe die Analyse in zwei Schritte aufgeteilt. Im ersten Schritt habe ich Chinas 
Daten mit jenen der USA, die als einzige Weltmacht der Maßstab sind, gestellt. Das Ergebnis 
war, dass China vergleichsweise stärker wurde, jedoch noch beträchtlich davon entfernt ist 
der USA den Rang auf globaler Ebene abzulaufen. Im zweiten Schritt habe ich den Datensatz 
erweitert und Japan und Vietnam hinzugefügt. Ersteres ist war deshalb wichtig, da es schnell 
nach Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs zur lokalen macht aufgestiegen war, während letzteres im 
vierten Kapitel von Bedeutung ist. In dieser Berechnung kam ich zu dem Ergebnis, dass 
China Japan um die Jahrtausendwende überholt und den zweiten Rang hinter den USA 
eingenommen hat. Anhand der Datenauswertung wurde auch ersichtlich, dass Vietnam 
verglichen zu allen anderen Nationen sehr schwach war. 
Im letzten Teil der Arbeit habe die Beziehungen zwischen China und der ASEAN, 
beziehungsweise zwischen China und Vietnam untersucht. Die Handlungen der jeweiligen 
Staaten stehen im Einklang mit jenen, die die Theorie vorgibt. China versucht sich zunächst 
als (friedliche) Alternative anzubieten und lockt mit Geld und Kooperation. Seit 2003 jedoch 
beginnt das Reich der Mitte damit, immer aggressiver aufzutreten und scheut auch nicht davor 
zurück militärisch durchzugreifen. Auf der anderen Seite sehen beide, ASEAN und Vietnam 
im Aufstieg China zunächst eine Möglichkeit, der Vormachtstellung der USA 
entgegenzutreten. Auf der anderen Seite, stellen die Länder jedoch schnell fest, dass Chinas 
Entwicklung auch Negatives mit sich bringt. Vietnam im Besonderen versuchte sich 
dahingehend abzusichern, indem es ein weitreichendes Sicherheitsnetz aufbaut. Dazu gehört 
nicht nur die Förderung der Entwicklung des Landes, sondern auch, dass man versucht sich 
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mit China politisch zu einigen, da  man weiß, dass der Nachbar im Norden militärisch nicht 
besiegt werden kann. Für den Fall eines militärischen Konflikts mit Peking versuchte man 
sich nicht nur durch Kooperation mit den anderen ASEAN Staaten abzusichern, sondern vor 
allem auch dadurch, dass man Indien mit ins Boot holt. Darüber hinaus hat man seit 1990 die 
Beziehungen zu den USA aufgebessert und sich so noch weiter abgesichert. 
English 
China’s emergence is a development, which will more and more likely mix up the 
world’s power ranking and subsequently pose a serious threat to American hegemony. In my 
paper, based on Neorealist thought, I have tried to assess the consequences China’s 
emergence has had for the Southeast Asian region and Vietnam in particular between 1990 
and 2008. Upon introducing Neorealist theory, I have tried to present the most important 
aspects of China’s transformation. I have tried to portray these with a quantitative assessment 
from which I derived a power ranking of the involved nations. 
I divided my analysis into two parts. The first part compares data from China with 
those of the United States, which, as the sole super-power left, serves as a rule. The outcome 
was that China caught up significantly during the period of observation. However, China is 
still too far behind the U.S. to pose a serious threat on a global level. In a second step I added 
Japan and Vietnam to the assessment. While the first was added because it became the 
regional leader (behind the U.S.) relatively quickly after World War II, the latter was added 
because it is the center of attention in the fourth chapter. The results showed that China 
overtook Japan around the turn of the 21st century and took the second rank. This approach 
also helped to show that Vietnam was weak compared to the other nations.  
The last part of the paper focused on presenting the relations between China and the 
ASEAN, and China and Vietnam, respectively. Each nation’s actions are in accordance with 
what Neorealism predicts. Initially, China tries to position itself as a (peaceful) alternative and 
lures other states with money and cooperation. However, since 2003 the Middle Kingdom has 
become more aggressive and does not back off from using military action. Both, the ASEAN 
and Vietnam, consider China’s emergence an opportunity to break American hegemony. They 
quickly realized though that China’s development is also a threat. Vietnam in particular tried 
to ensure its security by building up a widespread network. This did not only include the 
(internal) development of the country, but also to resolve problems with China with 
diplomatic means since Hanoi knew it was never going to win a military conflict against its 
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powerful neighbor in. However, for the case such a conflict would occur, the Vietnamese 
government tried to balance China by working closely together with ASEAN and by bringing 
India into the region. In addition, Hanoi worked on improving its relations with the United 
States since 1990 as well to further increase its security. 
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